Taxation by Ohlenforst, Cynthia M. et al.
SMU Annual Texas Survey




K&L Gates LLP, cindy.ohlenforst@klgates.com
Sam Megally
K&L Gates LLP, sam.megally@klgates.com
William J. LeDoux
K&L Gates LLP, william.ledoux@klgates.com
Reese Brammell
K&L Gates LLP, reese.brammell@klgates.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smuatxs
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Annual Texas
Survey by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation








I. SALES TAX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
A. REPORTED CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
B. LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486
C. COMPTROLLER RULES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
II. FRANCHISE TAX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
A. REPORTED CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
B. LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498
C. COMPTROLLER RULES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
III. PROPERTY TAX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500
A. REPORTED CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500
B. LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 508
IV. PROCEDURE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
A. REPORTED CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
B. COMPTROLLER RULES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
V. OTHER SIGNIFICANT APPELLATE COURT
DECISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
Another comptroller, another legislative session, another set of new
rules, and another round of litigation. To differing extents, each of these
impacted Texas tax law during the Survey period. The cumulative effect
was significant in many respects. Comptroller Glenn Hegar’s team,
including both long-standing comptroller staff and new appointees,
brought a welcome willingness to work cooperatively with taxpayers
(though several contentious court cases reflect the (unsurprising) ongoing
role of litigation in interpreting tax statutes). Indeed, many of the
franchise tax and sales tax cases decided during the Survey period
focused specifically on statutory interpretation. Legislative changes
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continued the trend of not only reacting to judicial interpretations, but
also trying to find balance on multiple fronts: between raising tax revenue
and encouraging business growth, between taxing authorities’ needs and
taxpayers’ rights, and between aggressively pushing ahead on state-level




Statutory construction cases again dominated the sales tax world dur-
ing the Survey period, as courts focused not only on the precise meaning
of statutory language but also on the appropriate weight of disputed
comptroller interpretations. Taxpayers saw several significant victories as
courts appropriately chose statutory language over conflicting or incon-
sistent comptroller policies or interpretations.
In Allstate Insurance Company v. Hegar, the Austin Court of Appeals
addressed the meaning of “temporary employment service” in Tax Code
§ 151.057.2 In connection with certain weather events requiring the ser-
vices of additional claims adjusters, Allstate Insurance Company em-
ployed Pilot Catastrophe Services, Inc. Operating under an umbrella
agreement, Pilot provided claims adjusters to Allstate on an as-needed,
temporary basis and billed Allstate on a per-claims-handled and per-ad-
juster-day basis.3
In seeking a refund of taxes paid with respect to Pilot’s bills for its
services, Allstate argued the services are nontaxable under Tax Code
§ 151.057, which provides that services falling within the following param-
eters are not subject to sales tax:
[A] service performed by an employee of a temporary employment
service as defined by Section 93.001, Labor Code, for an employer to
supplement the employer’s existing work force on a temporary basis,
when the service is normally performed by the employer’s own em-
ployees, the employer provides all supplies and equipment neces-
sary, and the help is under the direct or general supervision of the
employer to whom the help is furnished.4
The trial court concluded that Allstate had failed to meet any of the
requirements of § 151.057(2) and was therefore not entitled to a refund.5
The court of appeals partially agreed with the trial court’s conclusion,
1. This Survey period covers selected developments from February 2014 to February
2016 and—instead of describing every case, rule, and legislative change during the
period—comments on the ones most likely to change significantly the legal landscape or
reflect an important trend.
2. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hegar, 484 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet.
filed); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.057 (West 2015).
3. Allstate, 484 S.W.3d at 619.
4. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.057(2).
5. Allstate, 484 S.W.3d at 615.
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though on much narrower grounds.6 The court of appeals focused on
what it viewed as the “economic realities” of the transaction between All-
state and Pilot.7 Relying in part on the long-standing rule of statutory
construction that an ambiguous taxing statute must be interpreted strictly
against the taxing authority, the court of appeals concluded that the um-
brella agreement, which required Pilot to guarantee a minimum number
of adjusters, was not “fatal to Allstate’s claims.”8 The court of appeals
noted that the sales tax is a “tax on the transaction,” and therefore the
relevant analysis should focus on “each sale of a taxable item,” and not—
as the comptroller urged—on the broader business relationship.9 Focus-
ing on Allstate’s discrete purchases of services, rather than on the theo-
retical potential effect of the continuing business relationship between
Allstate and Pilot, the court of appeals therefore held that Pilot was sup-
plementing Allstate’s existing work force on a temporary basis.10 This
holding should make it much easier for taxpayers who have similar “um-
brella” arrangements with service providers to prevail on this issue.
With respect to the requirement under § 151.057 that the “employer
provide[ ] all supplies and equipment necessary,” however, the court of
appeals concluded that Allstate’s interpretation was erroneous.11 Allstate
argued that “necessary” under this subsection should be interpreted in
the “absolute-impossibility sense,” thereby distinguishing supplies and
equipment that are essential to the performance of a service from those
that are merely a convenience.12 Under Allstate’s interpretation, equip-
ment such as cell phones and laptops, which Allstate generally did not
provide to Pilot claims adjusters, was merely a convenience for claims
adjusters.13 The court of appeals, however, concluded that the contracts
between Allstate and Pilot required the adjusting services to be provided
through cell phones, laptops, and other technological equipment, thereby
6. Id. at 634–35.
7. Id. at 617.
8. Id. at 629; see also Combs v. Roark Amusement & Vending, L.P., 422 S.W.3d 632,
637 & n.14 (Tex. 2013) (“We believe that in the area of tax law, like other areas of eco-
nomic regulation, a plain-meaning determination should not disregard the economic reali-
ties underlying the transactions in issue.”); Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 1 SMU
ANN. TEX. SURV. 101, 102–03 (2015) (discussing Roark Amusement & Vending, L.P., 422
S.W.3d 632).
9. Allstate, 484 S.W.3d at 623 (emphasis added).
10. For substantially the same reasons, the court of appeals also concluded that Pilot
met the definition of a “temporary employment service” under § 93.001 of the Texas Labor
Code. Id. at 626. The court of appeals viewed the transactions with Pilot separately and
declined to follow the comptroller’s urging to view Allstate and Pilot’s contractual relation-
ship “holistically.” Id. In reviewing the facts, the court of appeals also concluded that the
services at issue were normally performed by Allstate’s own employees who typically han-
dle claims adjustments and that Pilot’s adjusters were under the direct or general supervi-
sion of Allstate, either singularly or jointly with Pilot. Id. at 628.
11. Id. at 618, 625.
12. Id. at 632–33.
13. Id. at 633.
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making them necessary.14 Ultimately, the court of appeals found that, at
least with respect to some claims adjusters, the phones, laptops, and other
technological equipment were required to be used by the claims adjusters
under the contract, so these adjusters’ services were taxable.15
Southwest Royalties, Inc. v. Combs continued to confound and confuse
during the Survey period.16 Those who have been following the tortured
path of this case will remember that the trial court judge originally ruled
from the bench that certain taxpayer equipment used in the extraction of
oil and natural gas qualified for the manufacturing exemption, but then,
after a subsequent rehearing, entered a contrary ruling.17 The Austin
Court of Appeals has since had its turn to address the hotly contested
issue of whether certain equipment used in oil and gas extraction qualifies
under the manufacturing exemption.18
In this statutory construction case, Southwest Royalties claimed ex-
emptions for its “casing, tubing, pumps, and related parts” used to extract
oil and natural gas from the ground, asserting that the equipment met the
requirements of three manufacturing exemption provisions: a general
manufacturing exemption,19 a pollution control exemption,20 and a public
health exemption.21 All three exemptions require that the equipment for
which the exemption is sought be used or consumed in “the actual manu-
14. Id. at 634. The comptroller’s interpretation of “necessary” in this case is at odds
with the position taken by some comptroller auditors who, in the context of the manufac-
turing exemption, assert that necessary means impossible to do without.
15. The court of appeals agreed with Allstate that it was entitled to a refund for ser-
vices performed by certain Pilot claims adjusters who worked inside Allstate’s facilities and
for whom Allstate did provide all of the required equipment. Id. at 634–35.
16. See Sw. Royalties, Inc. v. Combs, No. 03-12-00511-CV, 2014 WL 4058950 (Tex.
App.—Austin Aug. 13, 2014) (mem. op.), aff’d, Sw. Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar, 59 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 1316 (Tex. June 17, 2016).
17. See Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 66 SMU L. REV. 1181, 1188–89 (2013).
18. See generally Sw. Royalties, 2014 WL 4058950, at *6.
19. This general manufacturing provision exempts:
[T]angible personal property directly used or consumed in or during the ac-
tual manufacturing, processing, or fabrication of tangible personal property
for ultimate sale if the use or consumption of the property is necessary or
essential to the manufacturing, processing, or fabrication operation and di-
rectly makes or causes a chemical or physical change to:
(A) the product being manufactured, processed, or fabricated for ultimate
sale; or
(B) any intermediate or preliminary product that will become an ingredient
or component part of the product being manufactured, processed or
fabricated for ultimate sale.
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(a)(2) (West 2015).
20. The pollution control exemption exempts: “tangible personal property used or
consumed in the actual manufacturing, processing, or fabrication of tangible personal
property for ultimate sale if the use or consumption of the property is necessary and essen-
tial to a pollution control process.” Id. § 151.318(a)(5).
21. The public health exemption exempts: “tangible personal property used or con-
sumed in the actual manufacturing, processing, or fabrication of tangible personal property
for ultimate sale if the use or consumption of the property is necessary and essential to
comply with federal, state, or local laws or rules that establish requirements related to
public health.” Id. § 151.318(a)(10).
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facturing, processing, or fabrication of tangible personal property.”22
The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s judgment in favor of the
comptroller, albeit on grounds different from those on which the trial
court relied.23 In addressing the statutory language, the court of appeals
noted that the text was unclear whether oil and gas extraction is included
in “manufacturing, processing, or fabrication.”24 The court of appeals
nevertheless opined that the legislature may not have intended to include
extraction activities.25 The court of appeals noted that in other contexts,
manufacturing and extraction were treated separately, and that dictiona-
ries often distinguished between manufacturing and extraction.26 Having
found the statute unclear, the court of appeals deferred to the comptrol-
ler’s interpretation, finding the equipment failed to qualify for exemp-
tion.27 Briefs to the Texas Supreme Court emphasized the legal
significance of this case, while at the same time comptroller and media
reports called attention to the financial impact of the case.28 The supreme
court granted Southwest Royalties’s Petition for Review and affirmed the
court of appeals decision.29
In Cirrus Exploration Company v. Combs, the Austin Court of Appeals
again focused on the meaning of a disputed statutory provision.30 Tax
Code § 151.328 exempts certain airplane purchases by a “certificated or
licensed carrier of persons or property.”31 Cirrus Exploration had pur-
chased a helicopter to hire out to the public for aerial tours, photography,
22. Sw. Royalties, 2014 WL 4058950, at *1–2 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.318(a)(2), (5), (10)).
23. In addressing TEX. TAX CODE § 151.318(a)(2), the trial court concluded that
Southwest Royalties’ equipment did not directly make or cause a chemical or physical
change to the oil and natural gas because, although the extracted petroleum separates into
oil and gas as it travels through Southwest Royalties’ equipment, this change is effected by
the change in pressure and temperature as the petroleum rises to the surface and not di-
rectly by the equipment bringing the petroleum to the surface. Sw. Royalties, Inc. v.
Combs, No. D-1-GN-09-004284, 2012 WL 7748950, at *1 (353d Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2012).
The trial court did not decide Southwest Royalties’ alternative arguments under TEX. TAX
CODE §§ 151.318(a)(5) and (10). Id.
24. Sw. Royalties, Inc., 2014 WL 4058950, at *5.
25. Id. at *4. Query whether this belated legislative analysis is consistent with the
comptroller’s earlier interpretations and hearings recognizing the exemption applies to ex-
traction activities and that such activities are “processing” within the meaning of § 151.318.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *5–6. The court of appeals also noted that because ambiguities in exemption
statutes are generally resolved in favor of taxation, the statute’s “ambiguity alone might
suffice to defeat Southwest Royalties’ claims.” Id. at *6.
28. See, e.g., Jim Malewitz, Oil Driller’s Lawsuit Could Cost Texas Billions in Tax Re-
funds, THE TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 30, 2016), http://www.texastribune.org/2016/01/30/drillers-law
suit-could-cost-state-billions-tax-ref/ [https://perma.cc/AS54-29NB]; see generally Sw. Roy-
alties, Inc., 2014 WL 4058950. In the absence of legislative history or a fiscal note evidenc-
ing a legislative plan to interpret the exemption so narrowly, the financial repercussions of
this statutory construction case should be irrelevant to the interpretation of the statutory
words.
29. Sw. Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar, 59 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1316 (Tex. June 17, 2016).
30. See generally Cirrus Expl. Co. v. Combs, 427 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014,
pet. denied).
31. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.328(a)(1) (West 2015). For a discussion of legislation
impacting aircraft transactions, see infra Article I. Sales Tax, Section B. Legislation.
484 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
surveys, and inspections.32 Because Cirrus limited its operations and use
of the helicopter to only certain flights for hire, Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) regulations required Cirrus to have only an FAA Letter
of Authorization, which authorized Cirrus to operate the helicopter under
Part 91 of the FAA regulations.33 The comptroller argued that “long-
standing policy” required a determination that a Letter of Authorization
by itself is insufficient to meet the requirements for exemption under
§ 151.328.34
However, the comptroller’s own long-standing rule on this exemption,
Rule 3.297, did not support the comptroller’s argument.35 The rule de-
fines “licensed and certificated carrier” as a “person authorized by the
appropriate state agency within the United States to operate an aircraft
. . . as a common or contract carrier transporting persons or property for
hire in the regular course of business.”36 The dispute focused on the
meaning of “authorized.”37 The comptroller argued that Cirrus must be
authorized under FAA regulations in addition to Part 91 in order to qual-
ify for exemption, while Cirrus asserted that the term requires only that it
hold whatever FAA authorization is required for its specific operations.38
In finding Rule 3.297 unambiguous, the court of appeals not only re-
fused to give deference to the comptroller’s alleged “long-standing pol-
icy” but also found the comptroller’s interpretation “squarely contrary to
the unambiguous language” of the rule.39 The court of appeals stated that
the term “‘[a]uthorize’ . . . merely denotes the conveyance or recognition
of legal authority or permission, and it is not limited to the conveyance of
legal authority or permission through the issuance of a certificate or li-
cense, or of any particular kind of certificate or license.”40 Therefore,
finding that Cirrus was authorized by the FAA to operate its helicopter as
a common carrier transporting persons or property for hire in the regular
course of business, the court concluded that Cirrus was entitled to an ex-
emption on its helicopter purchase.41
In a constitutional challenge to Tax Code § 151.307, the taxpayer in
H.K. Global Trading, Ltd. v. Combs argued that a twenty-four-hour wait-
ing period for refunds of sales tax paid on certain purchases of items ex-
ported outside the United States violated the U.S. Constitution’s Import-
32. Cirrus Expl., 427 S.W.3d at 466.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297(a)(1) (2016).
36. Id.
37. Cirrus Expl., 427 S.W.3d at 468–69.
38. Id. at 469. The court of appeals opined that the comptroller’s position appeared to
be founded on the structure of the FAA regulations, under which many air carriers, includ-
ing commercial airlines, would have to qualify not only under Part 91—the part under
which Cirrus was authorized to conduct its limited activities—but would also have to qual-
ify under additional parts of the regulations. Id. at 469–70.
39. Id. at 470–71.
40. Id. at 471.
41. Id.
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Export Clause.42 H.K. Global owned several stores located in counties
that bordered Mexico.43 Its customer had purchased goods and paid sales
tax on the purchases. Then, upon presentation of a U.S. Customs Broker
Export Certificate evidencing that the goods were being exported outside
the United States, H.K. Global refunded the sales tax to the customer,
but it did so before the expiration of the twenty-four-hour waiting period
required by Tax Code § 151.307(d)(1).44 To support its argument that the
twenty-four-hour waiting period is unconstitutional on its face, H.K.
Global was required to show that the waiting period always operates in
an unconstitutional manner.45
The Austin Court of Appeals determined that the twenty-four-hour
waiting period was not constitutional.46 The Import-Export Clause pro-
vides, “No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any Imposts
or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely neces-
sary for executing its inspection Laws.”47 The court of appeals distin-
guished tax-imposition provisions from procedural provisions and
concluded that the waiting period was merely a procedural provision and
did not impose a tax in violation of the Import-Export Clause:48
The waiting period is analogous to other procedural requirements in
section 151.307, such as the requirement in subsection (b) that the
customer present “proof of export” to a retailer in order to obtain a
refund of sales tax. H.K. Global has not cited, and we have not
found, any authority in which a court invalidated a statute imposing
an analogous procedural requirement based on the Import-Export
Clause.49
The court of appeals also noted that § 151.307 provides alternatives to the
twenty-four-hour waiting period, such as claiming an exemption from
sales tax by providing a bill of lading to the seller at the time of
purchase.50 The court of appeals concluded that H.K. Global had failed
42. H.K. Global Trading, Ltd. v. Combs, 429 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet.
denied); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.307(d)(1) (West 2015) (“A retailer who receives
documentation . . . relating to the purchase of tangible personal property exported beyond
the limits of the United States may not refund the tax paid under this chapter on that
purchase before . . . the 24th hour after the hour stated as the time of export of the docu-
mentation, if the retailer is located in a county that borders the United Mexican States.”);
id. § 151.307(e) (“A retailer who makes a refund before the time prescribed by subsection
(d) or makes a refund that is undocumented or improperly documented is liable for the
amount of the tax refunded with interest.”). For a discussion of a procedural issue decided
in H.K. Global Trading, see infra text accompanying notes 265–70.
43. H.K. Glob. Trading, 429 S.W.3d at 134.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 138.
46. Id. at 139.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
48. H.K. Glob. Trading, 429 S.W.3d at 139.
49. Id. (internal citation omitted).
50. Id. at 140; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.307(b)(1) (West 2015) (providing
that “a bill of lading issued by a licensed and certificated carrier of persons or property
showing the seller as consignor, the buyer as consignee, and a delivery point outside the
territorial limits of the United States” is proof of export for claiming an exemption).
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to show that § 151.307 always violates the Import-Export Clause.51
B. LEGISLATION
Though the 84th Texas legislature did not see many sales tax proposals,
a handful of successful bills resolved long-pending issues that have dis-
tracted—and often pained—taxpayers and the comptroller’s office
alike.52 Most significantly, Senate Bill 1396 created new Tax Code Chap-
ter 163 to address the sales and use tax treatment of specified aircraft
purchases and lease transactions.53 Chapter 163, which does not itself im-
pose a tax, clarifies—and in some respects modifies—the application of
Texas’s general sales and use tax under Chapter 151 to certain transac-
tions involving aircraft.54 Among other clarifications and modifications,
the bill’s new tax chapter (1) incorporates Federal Aviation Regulations
definitions for purposes of determining when a transfer occurs in a resale
scenario;55 (2) permits application of the resale exemption to aircraft
lease transactions without subsequent liability for divergent use, so long
as any divergent use does not represent more than 50% of departures in a
year;56 (3) carves out certain activities that will not give rise to taxable use
or a presumption of taxable use in Texas;57 (4) specifies that use by cer-
tain entities or persons related to a purchaser is not subject to tax if the
purchaser paid tax on its purchase of the aircraft or the purchase was
otherwise exempt in certain limited circumstances;58 and (5) provides that
the purchase, sale, or use of an aircraft under certain fractional ownership
programs is not subject to sales or use tax.59
House Bill 2507 addresses another area of the law that had been the
subject of sometimes-conflicting comptroller interpretations by explicitly
providing an exemption for digital transmission equipment purchased for
use by radio stations.60 After the legislature enacted a similar exemption
for television stations in 2001,61 the comptroller stated in a 2002 policy
ruling that the exemption also applied to radio stations.62 The comptrol-
ler, however, later revised this interpretation, resulting in a denial of a
radio station’s claim for the exemption in a 2010 administrative refund
51. H.K. Glob. Trading, 429 S.W.3d at 140.
52. See Tex. S.B. 1396, 84th Leg. R.S. (2015).
53. See id.; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 163.001–163.009.
54. Id. § 163.008.
55. Id. § 163.002(b).
56. Id. § 163.002(c).
57. Id. § 163.004.
58. Id. § 163.006(b).
59. Id. § 163.007.
60. Tex. H.B. 2507, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).
61. Tex. S.B. 1, 77th Leg., R.S. (Tex. 2001). For a chronological discussion of the devel-
opment of this legislation, see respectively Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 53 SMU
L. REV. 1297, 1308 (2000); Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 55 SMU L. REV. 1315,
1321–22 (2002); Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 56 SMU L. REV. 2027, 2034 (2003).




hearing.63 House Bill 2507 defines equipment qualifying for the exemp-
tion, and radio stations should carefully analyze their purchases to ensure
that the exemption applies.64
C. COMPTROLLER RULES
The comptroller proposed, adopted, amended, and repealed multiple
rules during the Survey period.65 Faced with an overwhelming number of
rules in need of substantive revisions, the comptroller placed a high prior-
ity on making only the most critical changes, such as implementing cer-
tain legislative changes, including, in some instances, long-overdue
changes relating to amendments from earlier legislative sessions.66 Con-
sistent with the focus of this article on key developments, this discussion
includes only some of the rule changes from the Survey period.67
Substantial debate accompanied the changes addressing nexus in Rule
3.286. According to the preamble, the rule amendments were designed to
memorialize comptroller policy and to reflect changes made by legislation
from the 2011 and 2013 sessions.68 Of note, the amendment adds to the
comptroller’s list of activities that give rise to nexus but also identifies
63. Hearing No. 103,311, STAR Doc. No. 201009918H, Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Ac-
counts (Sept. 28, 2010), http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/opendocs/open32/201009918h.html
[https://perma.cc/UA4M-93D5].
64. Tex. H.B. 2507, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).
65. See infra note 67.
66. See id.
67. The comptroller repealed several rules and adopted several other rules and
amendments to rules not discussed in this Survey, including adopting rules and amend-
ments related to occasional sales, newspapers, customs brokers, criminal offenses and pen-
alties, and local sales and use taxes. See, e.g., 39 Tex. Reg. 2114, 2116 (2014) (codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.360 (2016) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,
Customs Brokers)); 39 Tex. Reg. 9597, 1603 (2014) (codified as an amendment to 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.334 (Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Local Sales and Use Taxes)); 41
Tex. Reg. 260, 261 (2016) (codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.334
(Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Local Sales and Use Taxes)); 40 Tex. Reg. 7096, 7096
(2015) (codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.299 (Tex. Comptroller of
Pub. Accounts, Newspapers, Magazines, Publishers, Exempt Writings)); 40 Tex. Reg. 7242,
7243 (2015) (codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316 (Tex. Comptrol-
ler of Pub. Accounts, Occasional Sales; Transfers Without Change in Ownership; Sales by
Senior Citizens’ Organizations; Sales by University and College Student Organizations;
Sales by Nonprofit Animal Shelters)). The comptroller also proposed sweeping (and at
times overreaching) changes to rules related to aircraft, the sale for resale exemption, and
the repair, remodeling, maintenance, and restoration of tangible personal property, which
proposed rules were eventually withdrawn. See 39 Tex. Reg. 8503, 8506 (2014) (to be codi-
fied at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.280 (withdrawn Apr. 28, 2015) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub.
Accounts)); 39 Tex. Reg. 8513, 8517 (2014) (to be codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.285
(withdrawn Apr. 28, 2015) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts)); 39 Tex. Reg. 8520, 8522
(2014) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.292 (withdrawn Apr.
28, 2015) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts)); 39 Tex. Reg. 8526, 8527 (2014) (to be
codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297 (withdrawn Apr. 28, 2015) (Tex. Comptroller of
Pub. Accounts)).
68. 40 Tex. Reg. 3183 (2015) (codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.286 (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Seller’s and Purchaser’s Responsibilities, in-
cluding Nexus, Permits, Returns and Reporting Periods, and Collection and Exemption
Rules)).
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certain activities falling within a safe harbor.69 For instance, the amend-
ment adds the following to the rule’s list of activities supporting a deter-
mination that a seller is engaged in business in Texas: (1) being formed,
organized, or incorporated under, and having internal affairs governed
by, Texas law, which according to the rule’s preamble, “memorialize[s]
current comptroller policy”; and (2) holding a substantial ownership in-
terest in certain entities that maintain a location in Texas.70 The rule
amendment also expressly implements the safe harbor addressed in Ry-
lander v. Bandag Licensing Corporation71 for a person who has no con-
nection with Texas except the possession of a certificate of authority to do
business in Texas and discusses the safe harbor created by Tax Code
§ 151.108 for a person whose only activity in Texas is as a user of Internet
hosting.72 The rule amendment also removed the controversial trailing
nexus provision, which required an out-of-state seller to continue to col-
lect use tax for twelve months after it had ceased to be engaged in busi-
ness in Texas.73
The comptroller adopted new Rule 3.340 to implement House Bill 800,
which added new Tax Code § 151.3182 and created a sales and use tax
exemption and franchise tax credit related to certain research and devel-
opment activities.74 New Rule 3.340 sets out procedures for registering
for and claiming the qualified research exemption and specifies—as does
Tax Code § 151.318275—that a taxpayer that claims the sales tax exemp-
tion may not also claim the franchise tax credit.76 Rule 3.340 also pro-
vides procedures that enable the comptroller to cancel a taxpayer’s
registration and eligibility for the sales tax exemption if the taxpayer fails
to comply with the exemption’s requirements.77
The comptroller also adopted new Rule 3.335 to implement Tax Code
§ 151.359, which provides an exemption from state (but not local) sales
tax for certain tangible personal property purchases made in connection
69. See id.
70. See id.; 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.286(a)(3)(H), (I) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Ac-
counts, Seller’s and Purchaser’s Responsibilities, including Nexus, Permits, Returns and
Reporting Periods, and Collection and Exemption Rules).
71. 18 S.W.3d 296, 301 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied).
72. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.286(a); see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.108(b)
(West 2015).
73. See 40 Tex. Reg. 3183 (2015) (codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.286 (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Seller’s and Purchaser’s Responsibilities, in-
cluding Nexus, Permits, Returns and Reporting Periods, and Collection and Exemption
Rules)).
74. See 40 Tex. Reg. 8663 (2015) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.340 (Tex.
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Qualified Research)); see also Ohlenforst et al., supra note
8, at 101, 107–08 (discussing House Bill 800 passed by the 83rd Texas legislature).
75. TEX TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3182 (West 2015).
76. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.340(b)(2) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,
Qualified Research); see also infra Article II. Franchise Tax (discussing franchise tax
credit).
77. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.340(c)(5) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,
Qualified Research).
2016] Taxation 489
with building or refurbishing data centers located in Texas.78 Like several
other comptroller rules, in addition to implementing the statute and pro-
viding procedures for its administration, Rule 3.335 also appears to in-
clude some substantive provisions not found in the statutory language.79
For instance, consistent with the comptroller’s position regarding other
exemptions for electricity, Rule 3.335 requires some data centers to per-
form a predominant use study to determine taxable and nontaxable uses
of electricity for which an exemption is sought.80
Furthermore, Rule 3.335 states that in order for an expenditure to be
counted toward the capital investment requirement, the expenditure must
be invoiced to the qualifying owner, operator, or occupant, and that
purchases by entities related to these qualifying entities do not count to-
ward the capital investment requirement.81 Rule 3.335 also requires ap-
plicants to agree to toll the statute of limitations for assessments until the
comptroller is able to verify that the applicant has met the capital invest-
ment and job creation requirements and states that the comptroller will
audit data centers five years after qualifying for the exemption to verify
compliance with the requirements.82
Another rule adopted by the comptroller that relates to state—but not
local—sales tax is Rule 3.345, which relates to a limited refund for certain
property used in cable television, Internet access, and telecommunica-
tions services.83 Like Rule 3.335 above, Rule 3.345 also expands on the
statutory language in an apparent attempt to limit the activities that qual-
ify for the refund.84 For instance, the statute’s language describing the
“distribution of cable television services” is modified in the rule to add
that the services must be distributed “by the sending or relaying of video
programming for the fulfillment of cable television services[ ] to subscrib-
ing or paying customers.”85
78. See 39 Tex. Reg. 1157 (2014) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.335 (Tex.
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Property Used in a Qualifying Data Center; Temporary
State Sales Tax Exemption)); see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.359; Ohlenforst et al.,
supra note 8, at 101, 107 (discussing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.359).
79. See, e.g., 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.335(b)(1)(A) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Ac-
counts, Property Used in a Qualifying Data Center; Temporary State Sales Tax
Exemption).
80. Id.; see also id. § 3.295(e), (f) (requiring a predominant use study for the manufac-
turing exemption and other nontaxable use).
81. Id. § 3.335(d)(2)(B).
82. Id. § 3.335(e)(1)(C).
83. 39 Tex. Reg. 6863 (2014) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.345 (2016) (Tex.
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Annual Refund Program for Providers of Cable Television,
Internet Access, or Telecommunications Services)); see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.3186 (West 2015); Ohlenforst et al., supra note 8, at 101, 108 (discussing TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.3186); id. at 108–09 (discussing the amendments made to Rule 3.313
related to cable television service and bundled cable service).
84. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.345(a)(7)(B) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,
Annual Refund Program for Providers of Cable Television, Internet Access, or Telecom-
munications Services) (expanding on the statutory descriptions of “the distribution of cable
television services,” “the provision of Internet access services,” and “the transmission, con-
veyance, routing, or reception of telecommunications services”).
85. Id. § 3.345(a)(7)(B)(i).
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Also, in part because the refund is limited to an aggregate $50 million
(prorated among eligible providers if this limit is exceeded), Rule 3.345
sets out onerous request requirements.86 Pursuant to the rule, requests
are required to include detailed information regarding the transactions
for which a refund is sought, and if a taxpayer does not provide informa-
tion requested by the comptroller within thirty days of the request, the
amount of refund requested may be reduced accordingly.87 Furthermore,
Rule 3.335 states that interest will not be paid on refunds, which could
amount to significant dollars if, for instance, a refund request is disputed
and significant time is spent resolving the dispute through administrative
and legal channels.88 The rule also highlights the importance of making a
timely refund request: under the rule, late-filed requests in a year when
the aggregate requests exceed the $50 million limit “will be denied for
lack of funds.”89
The comptroller adopted amendments to Rule 3.338, which relate to
multistate tax credits.90 The amendments clarify the order in which multi-
state tax credits may be applied against state and local taxes and repeal
subsections that had provided special rules for certain taxpayers, includ-
ing contractors and motor vehicle and aircraft repair persons.91 The
amendments also clarify that the credit is not allowed against the Texas
Emissions Reduction Plan Surcharge.92
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. REPORTED CASES
Although it has been almost ten years since enactment of the revised
Texas franchise tax, taxpayers and the comptroller still frequently face
issues of first impression.93 Resolving these issues often depends on con-
struing statutory language and interpreting concepts that can differ mark-
edly from those underlying other states’ taxing statutes.94 Some of the
controversial provisions, including some relating to exclusions from gross
receipts, are new to Texas and have triggered multiple contests.95 Other
statutory concepts, including ones relating to apportionment factors, are
86. See id. § 3.345(e)(1).
87. Id. § 3.345(d)(4)(C)(iv); see generally id. § 3.345(d).
88. Id. § 3.345(d)(5); see also id. § 3.345(e)(4), (5) (providing that final refund pay-
ments will not be issued until all refund hearings and judicial proceedings are final).
89. Id. § 3.345(f)(2).
90. See 39 Tex. Reg. 5427 (2014) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.338 (Tex.
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Multistate Tax Credits and Allowance of Credit for Tax
Paid to Suppliers)).
91. See id.
92. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.338(e) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Multis-
tate Tax Credits and Allowance of Credit for Tax Paid to Suppliers).
93. See Josh Haney & Bruce Wright, The History of the Texas Franchise Tax, FISCAL
NOTES (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts), May 2016, at 4–6, http://comptrol-
ler.texas.gov/fiscalnotes/may2015/fn.pdf [https://perma.cc/AMX5-2C32].
94. See id. at 5.
95. See, e.g., Titan Transp. LP v. Combs, 433 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014,
pet. denied).
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carryovers from the “old” franchise tax, but give rise to new questions in
a new context.96
In Titan Transportation, LP v. Combs, the Austin Court of Appeals
addressed whether a company that transports aggregate to construction
sites was entitled to exclude from its gross receipts payments that it was
contractually obligated to make to its subcontractors.97 Titan was in the
business of transporting and depositing aggregate to construction sites
where it was used to make concrete or as a foundation for various real
property improvements. At the direction of a general contractor or site
foreman, Titan’s subcontractors would deposit the aggregate in specified
areas—often the “final resting place” for the aggregate—saving the con-
tractor or site manager time and labor that would otherwise be spent
moving the aggregate.98 Titan provided these services to its customers,
which included quarries and construction companies, but had “written
contracts only with its subcontractors.”99
The principal issue before the court of appeals was the interpretation of
Tax Code § 171.1011(g)(3), which provides an exclusion from total reve-
nue for: “subcontracting payments handled by the taxable entity to pro-
vide services, labor, or materials in connection with the actual or
proposed design, construction, remodeling, or repair of improvements on
real property or the location of the boundaries of real property.”100 Con-
trary to the plain language of § 171.1011(g)(3), the comptroller inter-
preted the section to require that Titan be a “‘construction company’ that
provides services, labor, or materials that effect a physical change to the
property,” and the comptroller argued that Titan was instead a “transpor-
tation company” that did not effect such physical change.101 Further-
more, the comptroller argued that Titan was required to have a tripartite
contract among itself, its customers, and its subcontractors.102
Reversing the trial court’s judgment against Titan, the court of appeals
concluded that the comptroller’s interpretation imposed additional, ex-
96. See, e.g., 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 3.591(c) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Mar-
gin: Apportionment).
97. Titan Transp., LP v. Combs, 433 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet.
denied). Titan also argued in the alternative that its subcontractor payments qualified for
inclusion in its COGS deduction calculation. Id. at 631. The comptroller has since ad-
dressed the court decisions in Titan and Combs v. Newpark Res., Inc., 422 S.W.3d 46 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) in a policy memorandum. See STAR Doc. No. 201606856L,
Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts (June 30, 2016), http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/opendocs/
open32/201606856l.html [https://perma.cc/A8S2-6JNG]; see also Ohlenforst et al., supra
note 8, at 101, 109–11 (discussing Combs v. Newpark Res., Inc.).
98. Titan Transp., 433 S.W.3d at 633–34.
99. Id. at 633–34, 641.
100. Id. at 637 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1011(g)(3) (West 2015)).
101. Id. at 632.
102. Id. at 641. In a Hail Mary-type argument that defied basic accounting, the comp-
troller also argued that Titan’s payments could not be “flow-through” payments because
Titan did not segregate its revenue for each subcontractor payment and because, based on
the accrual method of accounting, Titan would pay its subcontractors prior to actually re-
ceiving payment from its customers. See id. at 641–42. Unsurprisingly, the court of appeals
dismissed these arguments. See id. at 642.
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tra-statutory requirements on an unambiguous statute.103 Dismissing the
comptroller’s argument that Titan must be a “construction company,” the
court of appeals focused on the statutory requirement that a taxable en-
tity provide its services “in connection with” construction and deemed
the language broad enough to cover Titan’s activities but not so broad as
to be ambiguous.104 Furthermore, the court of appeals determined that
the comptroller’s attempt to limit this language by requiring a physical
change to the real property was inconsistent with the statute, which in-
cludes reference to the proposed design and construction of real prop-
erty.105 The court of appeals stated that § 171.1011(g)(3) requires a nexus
“established by evidence that Titan provided services that were logically
and reasonably connected with the construction of improvements on real
property and, indeed, were directly related to the construction of such
improvements.”106 The court of appeals concluded that Titan’s activities,
which were “necessary and integral to the construction of improvements
on real property” and “saved the construction companies time, labor, and
money,” met this requirement.107
The court of appeals also concluded that the statute does not require
that there be a tripartite agreement.108 Addressing the statutory language
“mandated by contract to be distributed to other entities” and acknowl-
edging that the purpose of this subsection is to prevent double taxation of
amounts that are not actually income to Titan, the court of appeals con-
cluded that, although the tripartite arrangement described by the comp-
troller could meet the statutory requirements, “such an arrangement is
not required under a plain reading of the statute.”109 Accordingly, Titan’s
payments under its subcontractor contracts met the requirements for
exclusion.110
In Hallmark Marketing Company, LLC v. Combs, the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals addressed the meaning of “net gain from the sale” used
to determine gross receipts from a taxpayer’s entire business for purposes
of apportionment under Tax Code § 171.105(b).111 During the tax year at
issue, Hallmark incurred substantial losses on sales of investments and
capital assets.112 Section 171.105(b) provides that “[i]f a taxable entity
sells an investment or capital asset, the taxable entity’s gross receipts
from its entire business for taxable margin includes only the net gain from
103. Id. at 641.
104. Id. at 637–38.
105. Id. at 638.
106. Id. at 639.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 641.
109. Id. at 640–41.
110. Id. at 642.
111. Hallmark Mktg. Co. v. Combs, No. 13-14-00093-CV, 2014 WL 6090574, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi Nov. 13, 2014) (mem. op.), rev’d by Hallmark Mktg. Co. v. Hegar,
488 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2016). A docket equalization order issued by the Texas Supreme
Court transferred the appeal to the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals. Id. at *1 n.1.
112. Id. at *3.
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the sale.”113 The comptroller interprets this section in Rule 3.591: “If the
combination of net gains and losses results in a net loss, the taxable entity
should net the loss against other receipts, but not below zero.”114
Arguing that § 171.105(b) is unambiguous, Hallmark asserted that it
was not required to subtract these losses from other receipts because
§ 171.105(b) requires “only the net gain” be included in gross receipts,
and therefore its net loss should not be included for apportionment pur-
poses.115 The comptroller disagreed, arguing that Hallmark was required
to subtract the net loss from gross receipts because (1) Hallmark was re-
quired to report those amounts as income, and therefore the amounts
must also be reported in everywhere receipts for apportionment pur-
poses; (2) a 1974 appellate court case interpreted similar statutory lan-
guage to require that gains and losses be offset to calculate a net figure;
and (3) § 171.105(b) is ambiguous, and the comptroller’s interpretation in
Rule 3.591 was a reasonable interpretation of § 171.105(b).116
Focusing on the comptroller’s third argument, the court of appeals
agreed that § 171.105(b) is ambiguous and that the comptroller’s inter-
pretation in Rule 3.591 is reasonable.117 The court of appeals noted that
net gain is subject to two interpretations: (1) it “may refer to the particu-
lar gain or loss that results from each individual sale when proceeds are
offset by costs”; or (2) it “may instead refer to the taxpayer’s cumulative
gain or loss on its various investment and capital asset sales made
throughout the year.”118 Relying on Calvert v. Electro-Science Investors,
Inc.,119 which construed a former Tax Code section similar to
§ 171.105(b) to require that gains and losses be offset in order to arrive at
a net figure, the court of appeals concluded that Rule 3.591 is reasonable
and therefore entitled to deference by the court.120 The court of appeals
therefore upheld the trial court’s judgment in favor of the comptroller’s
apportionment calculation.121 The Texas Supreme Court, however,
granted Hallmark’s Petition for Review and reversed the court of ap-
peals’ decision.122
In American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Hegar, the Austin Court of Appeals
addressed whether a movie theater qualifies for the cost of goods sold
deduction under the franchise tax (COGS).123 The court of appeals ad-
dressed (1) whether American Multi-Cinema’s (AMC) movies were
113. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.105(b) (West 2015).
114. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.591(e)(2) (2016) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,
Margin: Apportionment).
115. Hallmark Mktg., 2014 WL 6090574, at *3.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *4.
118. Id.
119. 509 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1974, no writ.).
120. Hallmark Mktg., 2014 WL 6090574, at *4–5.
121. Id. at *5.
122. Hallmark Mktg. Co. v. Hegar, 488 S.W.3d 795, 796 (Tex. 2016).
123. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Hegar, No. 03-14-00397-CV, 2015 WL 1967877, at *1
(Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30, 2015, no pet.).
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“goods” for Texas franchise tax purposes; and (2) assuming AMC quali-
fied for the COGS deduction, which parts of AMC’s auditoriums quali-
fied for deduction.124
The comptroller argued that AMC was selling a service or an intangible
right to watch a movie and was therefore not entitled to the COGS de-
duction.125 Focusing on the franchise tax definition of “tangible personal
property,” however, the court of appeals determined that AMC’s movies
are “personal property that can be seen, weighed, measured, felt, or
touched or that is perceptible to the senses in any other manner.”126 The
court of appeals was not persuaded by the comptroller’s argument that
AMC’s films were not tangible personal property because AMC’s cus-
tomers did not take home a copy of the films after viewing them; the
court of appeals reasoned that the definition of tangible personal prop-
erty in § 171.1012 “does not have a take-home requirement.”127
With respect to the second issue, AMC argued that most of the square
footage in its theater auditoriums qualified for the COGS deduction;
however, the trial court accepted the comptroller’s assertion that only the
square footage housing speakers and screens qualified.128 On appeal, the
court of appeals reversed the trial court’s determination and refused to
give deference to the comptroller’s interpretations or calculations.129 The
court of appeals concluded that the term “production,” which is defined
to include “creation” and “improvement,” was not ambiguous, and there-
fore the comptroller was not entitled to deference.130 AMC argued that
its evidence established that “the sight, sound, and lighting in the audito-
rium space” were integral to the production of its film product.131 Apply-
ing the plain meaning of “production,” the court of appeals reversed the
trial court’s findings and rendered judgment based on AMC’s uncontro-
verted evidence, holding that costs associated with auditorium space are
direct costs of producing AMC’s product.132
After the court of appeals issued its decision, the comptroller issued a
warning that the court’s ruling, if upheld on appeal, would result in mas-
124. Id. at *4, 7; see also Ohlenforst et al., supra note 8, at 101, 111 (discussing the trial
court’s decision).
125. Am. Multi-Cinema, 2015 WL 1967877 at *4; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.1012(a)(3)(B) (West 2015) (excluding “intangible property” and “services” from the
definition of “tangible personal property”).
126. Am. Multi-Cinema, 2015 WL 1967877, at *5–6; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.1012(a)(3)(A) (defining “tangible personal property”); id. § 171.1012(a)(1) (includ-
ing “tangible personal property” in definition of “goods”). The court of appeals also noted
that the comptroller’s interpretation conflicted with another part of the definition of “tan-
gible personal property,” which includes “films . . . without regard to the means or methods
of distribution or the medium in which the property is embodied.” Am. Multi-Cinema, 2015
WL 1967877, at *6; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(a)(3)(A)(ii).
127. Am. Multi-Cinema, 2015 WL 1967877, at *5; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.1012(t) (enacted in 2013 and permitting movie theaters to subtract COGS).
128. Am. Multi-Cinema, 2015 WL 1967877, at *7.
129. Id. at *9.
130. Id. at *7–8.
131. Id. at *8.
132. Id. at *9.
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sive budget shortfalls.133 In particular, the comptroller asserted that the
American Multi-Cinema decision could affect revenues to the tune of
about $1.5 billion.134 Putting aside the issue of whether it is appropriate
to try to use financial results to influence statutory interpretation, the
comptroller’s dire forecast is surprising on several fronts. Most surprising,
perhaps, is the comptroller’s explicit acknowledgement that the holding
in American Multi-Cinema would reach taxpayers and industries far be-
yond those at issue in the case—particularly given the movie and broad-
cast-specific statutory language on which the comptroller might have
relied in trying to limit the scope of the court’s ruling.135
The debate over the nature and impact of the revised franchise tax
raged on in a Survey period marked by tension between states’ desires to
expand tax bases—if not tax rates—and some taxpayers’ desires for uni-
formity and predictability in taxation. While states such as California
have openly rejected the Multistate Tax Compact in favor of unfettered
independence for their various tax regimes,136 in Texas, taxpayers and the
comptroller—with the help of the courts—have waded ever deeper into
analyses of what the 79th Texas legislature wrought in enacting the re-
vised franchise tax.137
In Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar, the Austin Court of Appeals
considered a taxpayer’s argument that the Texas franchise tax is an “in-
come tax,” as defined in Texas Tax Code Chapter 141138 and that the
taxpayer should therefore be allowed to choose the Multistate Tax Com-
pact (MTC) three-factor formula for franchise tax apportionment
purposes.139
Following a trial court decision rejecting Graphic Packaging’s claim
that it was entitled to use the MTC formula, Graphic Packaging appealed,
relying on three primary arguments: (1) Tax Code § 171.106(a), requiring
a single-factor formula, did not impliedly repeal Chapter 141’s MTC pro-
visions; (2) if the provisions were repealed, such repeal was invalid be-
cause the MTC is a binding interstate agreement; and (3) the franchise
tax is an income tax as defined by the MTC and therefore subject to the
133. See Glenn Hegar, A Message from the Comptroller, FISCAL NOTES (Tex. Comptrol-
ler of Pub. Accounts), June–July 2015, at 2, http://comptroller.texas.gov/fiscalnotes/june-
july2015/fn.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3V9-3XV4].
134. See Josh Haney, Franchise Tax Lawsuit Could Cost Texas $1.5 Billion a Year, FIS-
CAL NOTES (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts), June–July 2015, at 3, http://comptroller.
texas.gov/fiscalnotes/june-july2015/amc-decision.php [https://perma.cc/6AZH-K4SN].
135. See id.
136. See Gillete Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 363 P.3d 94, 96 (Cal. 2015).
137. See, e.g., Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar, 471 S.W.3d 138, 138 (Tex. App.—
Austin July 28, 2015, pet. filed).
138. Id. The Multi-State Tax Compact (MTC) is codified in Chapter 141 of the Texas
Tax Code. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 141.001 (West 2015). It allows taxpayers subject to
an income tax (in which income is subject to apportionment and allocation for tax pur-
poses) to choose whether to apportion and allocate income according to the manner pro-
vided by state law or the manner provided by the MTC. See id. The Texas franchise tax
provides for a single-factor test, whereas the MTC provides for a three-factor test. See TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. §§ 141.001, 171.106(a).
139. Graphic Packaging Corp., 471 S.W.3d at 139.
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MTC election and formula.140
Finding the third issue dispositive, the court of appeals concluded that
Graphic Packaging may not use the MTC’s three-factor formula for Texas
franchise tax apportionment.141 The MTC defines income tax as “a tax
imposed on or measured by net income including any tax imposed on or
measured by an amount arrived at by deducting expenses from gross in-
come, one or more forms of which expenses are not specifically and di-
rectly related to particular transactions.”142 Using this definition, the
court of appeals evaluated the Texas franchise tax and found that it is not
“measured by net income.”143 In coming to this conclusion, the court of
appeals declined to conclude that the franchise tax’s alternative or limited
computations—including the E-Z computation, the $1 million deduction,
the 70% of total revenue calculation, and COGS and compensation de-
ductions—were a measure of net income.144 The court of appeals also
declined to find that the exclusion of bad debts from total revenue meant
that total revenue was synonymous with net income.145 In holding that
the Texas franchise tax is not an income tax within the definition of the
MTC, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s conclusion requir-
ing Graphic Packaging to use the single-factor formula under Tax Code
Chapter 171 to apportion its margin for franchise tax purposes.146 The
taxpayer filed a Petition for Review with the Texas Supreme Court.147
In Rent-A-Center v. Hegar, the Austin Court of Appeals determined
whether a rent-to-own business qualifies for the 0.5% franchise tax rate
applicable to retailers.148 Rent-A-Center, which makes the majority of its
revenue from providing merchandise to customers via “rental-purchase”
agreements, argued that it was primarily engaged in retail trade for
franchise tax purposes.149 The comptroller, focusing on Rent-A-Center’s
SEC filings and agreements with customers, argued that Rent-A-Center’s
revenue was derived primarily from leases, not sales.150 The trial court
ruled in favor of the comptroller and “held Rent-A-Center was not enti-
tled to a refund.”151
140. Id. at 141.
141. Id. at 142, 147.
142. Id. at 143 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 141.001, art. II.4).
143. Id. at 147.
144. Id. at 144.
145. Id. at 143–47.
146. Id. at 147. Query whether the franchise tax, while not—according to the court—an
income tax under the MTC, may be a gross receipts tax for other purposes. See generally
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.106.
147. Graphic Packaging Corp., 471 S.W.3d 138 (petition for review filed by December
14, 2015).
148. Rent-A-Center v. Hegar, 468 S.W.3d 220, 220 (Tex. App.—Austin June 11, 2015,
no pet.). Effective for tax years after the years at issue in this case, the Tax Code was
amended to provide that “retail trade” specifically includes certain “rental-purchase agree-
ment activities.” Id. at 221; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0001(12)(D); Ohlenforst et
al., supra note 8, at 101, 111–12 (discussing the trial court’s decision).
149. Rent-A-Center, 468 S.W.3d at 222.
150. Id. at 224.
151. Id. at 221.
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In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals conceded that the
rental-purchase transactions are hybrids of rentals and sales, but asked,
“Are they more like sales or leases?”152 The court of appeals noted,
among other things, that all of Rent-A-Center’s merchandise is offered
for sale, 97% of its merchandise is sold in an average of twenty months
per item (the remaining 3% is stolen, damaged, or lost), and the amount
due under the rental-purchase agreements decreases with each pay-
ment.153 Because it deemed Rent-A-Center’s activities more like selling
than leasing, the court of appeals held that Rent-A-Center is primarily
engaged in retail trade and therefore qualifies for the more favorable
0.5% rate for retailers.154
In Gulf Chemical and Metallurgical Corporation v. Hegar, the Austin
Court of Appeals addressed whether a taxpayer must amend its federal
income tax return to account for an incorrectly reported exclusion from
gross receipts.155 Gulf Chemical performs environmental disposal and re-
cycling services for customers and offers customers a monetary credit for
precious metals recovered during the service.156 In its federal tax returns,
Gulf Chemical deducted the credits as cost of goods sold instead of prop-
erly excluding them from gross receipts as allowances, affecting Gulf
Chemical’s Texas apportionment calculations under Texas’s former
franchise tax.157
Interpreting statutes and regulations applicable to Texas’s former
franchise tax, the court of appeals looked to the substance of Gulf Chemi-
cal’s transactions with its customers to determine that the credits at issue
were properly treated as allowances.158 The court of appeals rejected the
comptroller’s arguments that Gulf Chemical was “bound by the way it
characterized the metals credits on its federal tax returns” and that Gulf
Chemical was attempting to retroactively change its accounting method;
the court of appeals stressed that the characterization of the credits for
franchise tax purposes must turn on the substance of the transactions and
not on the form they took on Gulf Chemical’s federal tax returns.159 The
court of appeals looked to former Rule 3.557 and found that the determi-
native issue is whether the credits qualify as allowances; if so, then Gulf
Chemical was entitled to adjust its computation of gross receipts to ac-
count for these allowances.160 The term “allowance” in former Rule 3.557
152. Id. at 225 (emphasis in original).
153. Id. at 224.
154. Id. at 225.
155. Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Hegar, 460 S.W.3d 743, 744 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2015, no pet.); see also Ohlenforst et al., supra note 8, at 101, 112 (discussing the
trial court’s decision).
156. Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp., 460 S.W.3d at 744.
157. Id. at 745–46.
158. Id. at 747–49.
159. Id. at 748.
160. Id. at 748 (providing that “sales returns and allowances that a seller allows reduce
gross sales of the seller in the computation of gross receipts”); 28 Tex. Reg. 1218 (2003)
(repealed by 38 Tex. Reg. 5109 (2013) (former 34 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 3.557(e)(31)
(Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Earned Surplus: Apportionment)).
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had not been further defined by the courts, the Tax Code, or the regula-
tions, so as a matter of first impression, the court of appeals considered its
ordinary, common meaning.161 Further, the court of appeals considered
both GAAP treatment of sales incentives and persuasive case law from
the Tax Court of the United States that instructed courts to “look at the
substance of a transaction rather than its form when determining whether
an adjustment should be properly considered an allowance.”162 Because
the credits at issue were allowances under former Rules 3.557, the trial
court’s judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded to determine
the amount of Gulf Chemical’s refund of franchise taxes.163
B. LEGISLATION
In the months leading up to the 84th Texas legislative session, practi-
tioners, taxpayers, and lawmakers alike speculated about the many possi-
ble tax bills that were likely to come out of the legislature. Following
much general discussion about tax relief—and oftentimes heated argu-
ments about what shape such relief would, could, and should take—the
84th Texas legislature did not produce many significant bills, unlike prior
sessions in which credits and other tax incentives,164 or wholesale revi-
sions of the franchise tax regime,165 played starring roles.
Though there continues to be much perennial noise around repealing—
and perhaps replacing—the franchise tax, no serious, viable bills
emerged.166 Owing primarily to differing state-tax philosophies, propo-
nents of relief tended to advocate for one or more of (1) sales tax rate
reductions; (2) property tax rate or appraisal caps; and (3) franchise tax
rate reductions. In the end, the tax relief package that did pass focused on
a significant franchise tax rate reduction167 and an increase in the amount
of the property tax homestead exemption.168 Several other tax bills of
interest did ultimately join this tax relief package, but they tended to be
161. Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp., 460 S.W.3d at 749 (citing BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 89 (9th ed. 2009)) The court of appeals defined the term “allowance” to imply a
transaction between two parties wherein the seller of goods or services allows the buyer a
credit or reduction against an original stated price. Id. Because the uncontroverted evi-
dence described the Gulf Chemical transactions as fitting within this definition, the court of
appeals held that the credits at issue were substantively allowances. Id.
162. Id. at 749–50 (citing Pittsburgh Milk Co. v. Comm’r, 26 T.C. 707, 708 (1956)).
163. Id. at 750–51.
164. See Ohlenforst et al., supra note 8, at 101, 113.
165. See id. at 114.
166. For bills proposing immediate outright repeal of the franchise tax, see, e.g., Tex.
S.B. 105, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); Tex. S.B. 175, 84th Leg. R.S. (2015). For bills proposing to
phase out the franchise tax over time, see, e.g., Tex. S.B. 138, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); Tex.
H.B. 193, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); Tex. H.B. 250, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015) (proposing to phase
out the franchise tax over time).
167. Tex. H.B. 32, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015) (reducing the general one percent rate to 0.75
percent and the 0.5% rate that applied to taxpayers primarily engaged in wholesaling and
retailing to be reduced to 0.375% and expanding availability of the “EZ calculation” to
businesses whose total revenue does not exceed $20 million and reducing the rate of those
businesses using the EZ computation from 0.575% to 0.331%).
168. Tex. S.B. 1, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).
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of more limited applicability. This Survey highlights those that garnered
significant attention and discussion.
House Bill 32 was the most significant of the handful of amendments to
the franchise tax.169 This bill decreased franchise tax rates by 25%, to
0.375% for certain wholesalers and retailers and to 0.75% for other taxa-
ble entities.170 The bill also extended the option to calculate tax due by
using the simplified “EZ calculation” to entities with total revenue of not
more than $20 million;171 previously, only entities with not more than $10
million of total revenue qualified to use this calculation.172 Entities apply-
ing the EZ computation will also enjoy a 40% rate reduction, from
0.575% to 0.331%.173
C. COMPTROLLER RULES
During the Survey period, the comptroller adopted several new rules
applicable to the franchise tax. These rules, like some of the sales tax
rules adopted during the Survey period, implement prior legislation and
provide guidance related to several tax incentives enacted by the Texas
legislature.
The comptroller adopted new Rule 3.598 related to a tax credit for cer-
tified rehabilitation of certified historic structures. The rule implements
House Bill 500, Section 14, 83rd Texas legislature, 2013, which added new
Subchapter S to Chapter 171 of the Tax Code.174 The rule—like Sub-
chapter S—provides guidelines and procedures for establishing and
claiming the credit, including procedures related to allocation of the
credit by a pass-through entity to its partners, members, or shareholders,
and procedures for selling or transferring the credit.175 Among other
things, Rule 3.598 also clarifies that the reporting entity of a combined
group may claim the credit for each member entity.176
The comptroller also adopted new Rule 3.599 related to a research and
development franchise tax credit. New Rule 3.340 implements House Bill
800, 83rd Texas legislature, 2013, which added Subchapter M to Chapter
169. Also of note, House Bill 2896 clarified that broadcasters’ receipts from licensing
income shall be apportioned to Texas based on the domiciles of their customers. See Tex.
H.B. 2896, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015). This construct is known generally as the “location of
payor” rule of apportionment. See id.
170. Tex. H.B. 32, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).
171. Id.
172. Id., see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1016(a) (West 2015).
173. Tex. H.B. 32, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).
174. See 40 Tex. Reg. 4904 (2015) (codified as 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.598 (2016)
(Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin: Tax Credit for Certified Rehabilitation of
Certified Historic Structure)).
175. See generally TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.901–171.908; 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.598 (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin: Tax Credit for Certified Rehabilita-
tion of Certified Historic Structure).
176. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.598(f)(3) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin:
Tax Credit for Certified Rehabilitation of Certified Historic Structure).
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171 of the Tax Code.177 The rule specifies—as does Subchapter M—that a
taxpayer that claims the research and development credit may not also
claim the corresponding sales tax exemption.178 In addition to the guide-
lines set forth by statute, Rule 3.340 also clarifies that both upper tier and
lower tier entities in a tiered partnership may claim a credit, albeit not for
the same qualified research expense.179 Acknowledging that the rule was
enacted after the effective date of the credit, Rule 3.340 also provides
guidelines for amending prior franchise tax returns on which a taxpayer
would otherwise have been entitled to claim a credit.180
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. REPORTED CASES
Texas property tax litigation during the Survey period featured many of
the perennial procedural issues familiar to taxpayers, practitioners, and
loyal readers of this Survey. The Survey period also saw a handful of
cases highlighting tensions between taxing jurisdictions’ budgetary con-
cerns and constraints, and taxpayers’ ability to challenge the manner in
which the jurisdictions impose and administer local property taxes. In
part as a response to some of these cases, the legislature may in the 2017
session consider wholesale administrative reforms, possibly including
constitutional amendments. Of course, much negotiation and arm wres-
tling will occur before it becomes clear what shape such reforms may
take.
Several cases have dealt with the aftermath of amendments to statutes
that provide guidelines for classifying heavy equipment. Six cases in three
Texas courts of appeals have come to generally consistent conclusions re-
garding the questions that have arisen.181 The three main issues with re-
spect to new Tax Code §§ 23.1241 and 23.1242 are: (1) whether natural
177. See 40 Tex. Reg. 1858 (2015) (codified as 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.599 (Tex.
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin: Research and Development Activities Credit)).
178. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.653; 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.599(d)(1) (Tex.
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Margin: Research and Development Activities Credit). For
a discussion of the corresponding sales tax exemption, see supra Article I. Sales Tax.
179. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.599(h).
180. See id. § 3.599(m).
181. See EXLP Leasing, LLC v. Ward Cty. Appraisal Dist., 476 S.W.3d 752 (Tex.
App.—El. Paso 2015, pet. filed); EXLP Leasing, LLP v. Loving Cty. Appraisal Dist., 478
S.W.3d 790 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. filed) (same holdings as Ward court); Valerus
Compression Servs. v. Reeves Cty. Appraisal Dist., 478 S.W.3d 20 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2015, pet. filed) (same holdings as Ward court); Midcon Compression, L.L.C. v. Reeves
Cty. Appraisal Dist., 478 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. filed) (same holdings
as Ward court); EXLP Leasing, LLC v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 475 S.W.3d 421
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. filed) (coming to the same conclusions as other courts; but
not addressing whether compressor packages are or are not heavy equipment); Valerus
Compression Servs. v. Gregg Cty. Appraisal Dist., 457 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015,
no pet.) (coming to the same conclusions as other courts with respect to taxable situs but
remanding the issues of whether compression packages were heavy equipment and
whether the method of calculation was “based on . . . reasonable market value” for further
proceedings because there was insufficient information to determine the issues as a matter
of law).
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gas compressor packages qualify as heavy equipment under the new pro-
visions; (2) whether the new provisions provide language for determining
taxable situs that trumps the general situs statute; and (3) whether the
provisions are unconstitutional.182 In 2011, the Texas legislature amended
§§ 23.1241 and 23.1242 governing taxation of heavy equipment to change
the definitions of “dealer,” “dealer’s heavy equipment inventory,” “sales
price,” and “total annual sales,” as well as the formulas for calculating the
market value of and tax due on heavy equipment inventory.183
Relying on these changes, dealers of heavy equipment inventory “for
lease or rent” began to calculate the market value of their inventory in a
manner that was previously available only to sellers, resulting in substan-
tially reduced tax liability for many.184 Moreover, these dealers claimed
their taxes were due in the county in which they kept their business ad-
dress or location, and not the county where the equipment was located.185
The respective appraisal districts disagreed and added a constitutional
challenge for good measure.186
With respect to the first issue, the courts that have addressed the issue
interpreted § 23.1231(a)(6), which defines “heavy equipment” to include
gas compressor packages. Compressor packages are equipment that facil-
itates production and processing of natural gas. When courts have been
presented with evidence that compressor packages have internal combus-
tion engines, they have held that compressor packages are self-powered
and are therefore heavy equipment as a matter of law.187
With respect to the second issue, courts agree that § 23.1241(f), which
directs the comptroller to adopt a dealer’s heavy equipment inventory
declaration form, is not a specific situs provision, and as such, the general
situs provision at Tax Code § 21.02(a) applies.188
Finally, with respect to the third issue, the appraisal districts have been
unable to demonstrate that §§ 23.1241 and 23.1242 are unconstitutional as
applied. Their first argument in support of this contention is that these
sections violate the constitutional requirement that property be taxed in
182. See, e.g., Ward Cty. Appraisal Dist., 476 S.W.3d at 756–58.
183. See, e.g., id. at 757.
184. See, e.g., id.
185. See, e.g., id. at 769.
186. See, e.g., id. at 758.
187. See, e.g., id. at 762 (basing its decision on the legislative intent and the plain lan-
guage of the statute). Compare id., with Valerus Compression Servs. v. Gregg Cty. Ap-
praisal Dist., 457 S.W.3d 520, 530–31 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.), in which the Tyler
Court of Appeals remanded the case because there was no evidence presented to deter-
mine as a matter of law that compressor packages were heavy equipment: “Our review of
. . . [the] evidence reveals no evidence proving that either the compressor packages or
cooler units have internal combustion engines. In short, Valerus provided no evidence ex-
plaining how its equipment functions. It is impossible to know if the equipment is ‘self-
powered’ in the absence of such an explanation.” Gregg Cty. Appraisal Dist., 457 S.W.3d at
530–31.
188. See, e.g., Ward Cty. Appraisal Dist., 476 S.W.3d at 769 (citing Gregg Cty. Appraisal
Dist., 457 S.W.3d at 526, and holding that reliance on the language of § 23.1241 and Prop-
erty Tax Form 50-265 for situs purposes is erroneous because nothing in the statute refers
to taxable situs and the cited form is “nothing more than a form”).
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proportion to its market value. Courts have generally reasoned that the
legislature determines the manner in which market value is measured
and, to challenge the legislature’s prescribed method, appraisal districts
are required to prove that the legislature acted arbitrarily or capri-
ciously.189 In Ward County Appraisal District, the El Paso Court of Ap-
peals noted that “it is eminently reasonable to require dealers of
inventory held for lease or rent in the ordinary course of business to pay
taxes only on inventory actually leased or rented”190; the appraisal dis-
tricts in cases that address the issue have failed to prove otherwise. The
second argument relating to §§ 23.1241 and 23.1242 is that they are un-
constitutional because they violate the constitutional requirement that
taxation be equal and uniform. This argument has been summarily dis-
missed because the valuation method prescribed is applied equally and
uniformly to all dealers of heavy equipment inventory.191 Petitions for
Review were filed with the Texas Supreme Court for several of these
cases.192
In Galveston Central Appraisal District v. Valero Refining - Texas L.P.,
the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals addressed an equal and uni-
form challenge related to Valero’s refinery.193 At trial, a “jury found that
the challenged portions of the Valero refinery had been unequally ap-
praised” and determined the equal and uniform value of the property was
equivalent to Valero’s experts’ figure.194
Among its arguments on appeal, the appraisal district asserted that
Valero’s experts’ analysis was conclusory because it did not explain why it
had excluded certain portions of the refineries from its calculations.195
On the first day of trial, Valero was granted leave to amend its petition,
“dropping its valuation challenge to two of the accounts: pollution control
189. See, e.g., Ward Cty. Appraisal Dist., 476 S.W.3d at 762–63.
190. Id. at 765.
191. See, e.g., id. at 767 (finding “there is no disparate treatment within the class”).
192. See, e.g., id. at 752 (petition for review filed by January 27, 2016).
193. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Valero Ref. - Texas L.P., 463 S.W.3d 177, 180
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. filed). As a preliminary matter the court of
appeals determined that the trial court had authority to review the taxpayer’s appeal from
the appraisal review board decision. Id. at 186–87. The appraisal district claimed that be-
cause taxpayers are prohibited from making piecemeal challenges to a property’s value
under the Tax Code, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 185 (citing
Covert v. Williamson Cent. Appraisal Dist., 241 S.W.3d 655, 658–60 (Tex. App.—Austin
2007, pet. denied)). The court of appeals disagreed, finding Covert did not address jurisdic-
tion and, in any case, Valero’s third amended petition satisfied the prohibition on piece-
meal challenges under Covert because, even though it specifically mentioned three account
numbers, the petition alleged that the entire property was unequally appraised. Id. at 186.
The appraisal district also claimed Valero forfeited its right to judicial review because it did
not file a statement under Tax Code § 42.08(b-1) stating the amount of taxes Valero would
pay before the delinquency date if it elected to pay the tax amounts not in dispute. The
court of appeals correctly dismissed this argument because “Valero paid the current tax
liability in full before the delinquency date” and therefore the statement requirement did
not apply. Id. at 187 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.08 (West 2015)).
194. Id. at 184.
195. Id. at 187–90.
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equipment and personal property and inventory.”196 In preparing their
equal-and-uniform analyses of the appraised value of the refineries,
Valero’s experts included the pollution control equipment in one analysis
and excluded it from another. The jury ultimately decided the analysis
that excluded the pollution control equipment was the correct measure,
resulting in a substantial reduction in value.197 The court of appeals
agreed with the appraisal district’s contention, finding that there was in-
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; the court of appeals held
that “Valero’s experts were required to explain why the value of the pol-
lution control equipment” was excluded from “their equal and uniform
analysis.”198 A Petition for Review was filed with the Texas Supreme
Court.199
In ETC Marketing, Ltd. v. Harris County Appraisal District, the First
Houston Court of Appeals looked to the Dormant Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution to determine whether natural gas stored by ETC in
the Bammel reservoir in Harris County for the purpose of selling the gas
later at a higher price was immune from local taxation.200 Property is
immune from local ad valorem taxation if federal law prohibits such a
tax.201 The U.S. Constitution forbids states from imposing discriminatory
burdens on interstate commerce.202 Relying on Complete Auto, the court
of appeals determined that even if the property at issue were in interstate
commerce, the property tax did not impose discriminatory burdens on
interstate commerce and therefore the property is not exempt from ad
valorem taxation under the U.S. Constitution.203
Under the Complete Auto test, the taxpayer has the burden to prove
that the tax “(1) applies to an activity lacking a substantial nexus to the
taxing State; (2) is not fairly apportioned; (3) discriminates against inter-
state commerce; or (4) is not fairly related to the services provided by the
State.”204 ETC Marketing argued the activity (storing natural gas) did not
have a substantial nexus despite its physical presence in the state, that the
tax is not fairly apportioned because it is impossible to determine which
gas is located under Harris County, and that it does not enjoy the benefit
of county public services because it owns the stored gas, not the reservoir
196. Id. at 191.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 192–93. The court of appeals rejected Valero’s arguments that the pollution
control equipment was properly excluded because each refinery’s equipment is different
and the equipment is ultimately exempt from taxation; as such, the experts’ equal and
uniform analysis should have focused on the appraised value, and not the final taxable
value which would not include exempt property. Id.
199. Id. at 177 (petition for review filed by July 21, 2015).
200. ETC Mktg., Ltd. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 476 S.W.3d 501, 503–04 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. filed). The court of appeals concluded as a prelimi-
nary matter that whether or not the gas was in interstate commerce did not matter because
even if it were in interstate commerce it could be subject to local taxation. Id. at 505.
201. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.12 (West 2015).
202. ETC Mktg., Ltd., 476 S.W.3d at 507–08 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
203. Id. at 523 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
204. Id. at 508 (citing Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298,
310–11 (1994)).
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in which it is stored.205 The court of appeals rejected these arguments,
concluding the physical presence of the natural gas in the county was suf-
ficient to establish substantial nexus, and it was uncontested that ETC
Marketing owns the natural gas.206 The court of appeals also found the
storage of the natural gas was supported by public services provided to
the reservoir.207 Having found the property tax acceptable under the
Complete Auto test, the court of appeals determined that even if the gas
were in interstate commerce, the tax imposed was appropriate.208 A Peti-
tion for Review was filed with the Texas Supreme Court.209
In Texas Student Housing Authority v. Brazos County Appraisal Dis-
trict, the Texas Supreme Court considered as a matter of first impression
“whether a dormitory-like facility owned by a ‘higher education facility
authority’ forfeits its property tax exemption by providing summer hous-
ing to non-college students attending university-sponsored instructional
programs.”210 The supreme court decided that the statute contained no
conditions and therefore, the exemption provision does not contain limi-
tations on how the housing authority may use the property at issue.211
The housing authority owned property exempt from property taxes
under the Higher Education Authority Act. The property, located near
Texas A&M University, was used during the summer for various extra-
curricular camps and activities that the appraisal district alleged violated
a requirement that the property be “devoted exclusively to the use and
benefit of the students, faculty, and staff members of an accredited insti-
tution of higher education.”212 The court of appeals reversed the denial of
tax-exempt status for 2005 but affirmed for 2006–2008 by distinguishing
among the types of extracurricular activities for which the dormitories
were being used, and both parties appealed.213 The supreme court looked
to the plain language of the statute and rejected the appraisal district’s
view that the housing authority forfeited its tax exemption with respect to
the dormitories.214
Section 53.46 of the Texas Education Code titled “Authority Exempt
From Taxation,” reads: “Because the property owned by authority will be
held for educational purposes only and will be devoted exclusively to the
205. Id. at 508–23.
206. Id. at 511–12.
207. Id. at 509, 521–22.
208. Id. at 523.
209. Id. at 501 (petition for review filed by October 14, 2015).
210. Tex. Student Hous. Auth. v. Brazos Cty. Appraisal Dist., 460 S.W.3d 137, 138 (Tex.
2015); see also Ohlenforst et al., supra note 8, at 101, 115 (discussing the court of appeals’s
decision that preceded this decision).
211. Brazos Cty. Appraisal Dist., 460 S.W.3d at 138. Noting that other provisions may
limit the housing authority’s use of the property, the supreme court clarified that its deci-
sion was not meant as a carte blanche for the housing authority to use the property in any
manner. Id. (noting that the housing authority “may be subject to . . . limitations affecting
its” ability to use the property, but “the exemption statute is not one of them”).
212. Id. at 138–40 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 53.46 (West 2015)).
213. Id. at 140.
214. Id. at 144.
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use and benefit of the students, faculty, and staff members of an accred-
ited institution of higher education, it is exempt from taxation of every
character.”215 The supreme court noted that the language of the provision
“states a presumption” about how the property is used followed by “an
unconditional proclamation (the property is tax-exempt).”216 The su-
preme court cited the unambiguous language as well as an example of a
tax exemption containing conditional language before holding that “the
statute imposes no conditions but rather declares the property-tax ex-
emption in absolute terms.”217 The supreme court also noted that “[t]he
Legislature is adept at qualifying tax exemptions, and if it wishes to dis-
qualify properties that facilitate university-backed extracurricular pro-
grams, it can amend the statute.”218
In Signal International Texas L.P. v. Orange County, Texas, the Beau-
mont Court of Appeals determined that a party to an agreement under
Tax Code § 1.111(e) may not attack that agreement under contract law
theories when the underlying basis for such an attack is a ground of pro-
test for which there are exclusive remedies provided under the Tax
Code.219 Signal and the appraisal district entered into a written settle-
ment agreement that related, in part, to a barge; the settlement agree-
ment constituted a § 1.111(e) agreement in which Signal explicitly waived
its right to take any other actions under the Property Tax Code. Signal
later discovered that the barge was in Mexico for the entirety of the tax
year at issue.220
Signal contended that there was “mutual mistake” with respect to the
settlement agreement, and as such, Signal raised a claim in equity to re-
scind the agreement.221 The trial court ruled against Signal, and Signal
appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in both dismissing for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction as well as determining that “Signal was re-
quired to exhaust administrative remedies under the Tax Code.”222
In ruling against Signal, the court of appeals distinguished In re Willacy
County Appraisal District and Dallas Central Appraisal District v. 1420
215. Id. at 142 (quoting TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 53.46).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 144.
218. Id.
219. Signal Int’l Tex. L.P. v. Orange Cty., Tex., No. 09-13-00412-CV, 2014 WL 7183667,
at *3–4 (Tex. App.— Beaumont, Dec. 18, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Signal’s equitable
claim for rescission of the § 1.111(e) agreement was based on mutual mistake with respect
to the taxable situs of its property. The court of appeals determined that because the Tax
Code provides a remedy for corrections to the appraisal roll when the taxable situs of the
property was not in the district in which the tax was assessed, the relief sought is not rescis-
sion based on mutual mistake, but rather is a ground of protest covered by the Tax Code’s
exclusive remedies. Id. at *5. The court of appeals left open the possibility that an agree-
ment may be rescinded when there is fraud or a different claim for equitable rescission. Id.
220. Id. at *1.
221. Id. at *1–2.
222. Id. at *2, *5. Chapters 41 and 42 of the Tax Code “establish[ ] a detailed set of
procedures” for a taxpayer to protest certain actions of the appraisal district, including
“inclusion of the owner’s property on the appraisal records”; moreover, these administra-
tive procedures are generally mandatory. Id. at *2–3.
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Viceroy Limited Partnership on which Signal relied to establish its posi-
tion that contract law can and should be applied to reform or rescind a
§ 1.111(e) agreement under the circumstances at issue.223 In Willacy, the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals determined that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying discovery that would allow the appellant to de-
velop the affirmative defense of fraud with respect to a § 1.111(e) agree-
ment; however, in Signal International, the court of appeals stressed that
it was not deciding on the merits of, nor did it find any authority that
would allow an affirmative defense of fraud with respect to a § 1.111(e)
agreement under the Tax Code.224 Similarly, the court of appeals distin-
guished 1420 Viceroy because it did not involve a § 1.111(e) agreement
and because the basis of the complaint was not a ground of protest con-
tained in the Property Tax Code; here, “Signal’s equitable suit,” based on
an alleged mutual mistake with respect to the taxable situs of property,
“is an attempt to protest . . . [t]he situs of property . . . an issue on which a
property owner must first exhaust its administrative remedies before as-
serting the issue in a lawsuit.”225 Moreover, the court of appeals noted
that Signal waived its right to exercise these remedies in the settlement
agreement.226 Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that Signal’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Tax Code deprived
the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.227
In Town & Country Suites, L.L.C. v. Harris County Appraisal District,
the First Houston Court of Appeals addressed whether a 2013 amend-
ment to the Tax Code allowing “judicial review of tax appraisals when a
protest and appeal have been filed” by an incorrect party applies when
the property owner is misidentified as opposed to merely misnamed.228
The property at issue was correctly identified, but the protest was filed by
Gowan, Sheenan & Patterson—the former owners of the property. Town
& Country filed an amended petition naming itself as the property owner,
but the appraisal district requested—and the trial court granted—a plea
to the jurisdiction “because the property owner was not the party that
223. See In re Willacy Cty. Appraisal Dist., No. 13-13-00550-CV, 2013 WL 5942707, at
*1 (Tex. App. Nov. 1, 2013, no pet.); Dall. Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. 1420 Viceroy Ltd.
P’ship, 180 S.W.3d 267, 268 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).
224. Signal, 2014 WL 7183667, at *4–5 (citing Willacy, 2013 WL 5942707, at *10).
225. Id. at *5 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.42, 42.09 (West 2015); Gen. Elec.
Credit. Corp. v. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist., 826 S.W.2d 124, 124–25 (Tex. 1991)).
226. Id. The court of appeals noted that because there were remedies to which Signal
was entitled and Signal chose to reach an agreement instead, Signal was not deprived of
due process of law. Id.
227. Id.
228. Town & Country Suites, L.L.C. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 461 S.W.3d 208, 210,
214 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). The Tax Code section at issue was
§ 42.21(h) which reads in relevant part:
The court has jurisdiction over an appeal under this chapter brought on be-
half of a property owner . . . regardless of whether the petition correctly
identifies the plaintiff as the owner . . . . Whether the plaintiff is the proper
party to bring the petition . . . must be addressed by means of a special excep-
tion . . . and may not be the subject of a plea to the jurisdiction.
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h).
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pursued the appeal within the statutory deadline.”229 Town & Country
appealed.
Town & Country argued that a 2013 amendment adding subsection (h)
to Tax Code § 42.21 allowed judicial review of a property tax appeal even
when the owner has been misidentified; the appraisal district argued that
the amendment only applies to cases of misnomer, in which the actual
property owner has appealed but is listed under the wrong name.230 Rely-
ing on the plain language of the statute, the court of appeals agreed with
Town & Country that the misidentification of the property owner did not
deprive the trial court of jurisdiction.231 The appraisal district further ar-
gued that § 42.21(h) was unconstitutional because “it would lead to advi-
sory opinions . . . because misidentified property owners do not have
standing to challenge tax valuations.”232 The court of appeals, however,
rejected this argument in part because § 42.21(h) is a vehicle for bringing
the proper party before the court; it does not allow parties without stand-
ing to obtain a final judgment in a suit that “does not affect the true
parties in interest.”233 The court of appeals concluded that “the newly
enacted subsection 42.21(h) grants a trial court subject matter jurisdiction
over a suit appealing a Board decision as long as the suit meets the filing
requirements contained in section 42.21(h), even if the petition misidenti-
fies the property owner and must be corrected through amendment.”234
In EXLP Leasing LLC v. Webb County Appraisal District, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals addressed whether the jurisdictional require-
ment of § 42.08(b) requires a taxpayer protesting the entire amount of its
tax assessment to pay any portion of the taxes assessed to sustain its right
to an appeal.235
Tax Code § 42.08(b) requires a property owner to pay a certain portion
of the assessed taxes before the property tax delinquency date in order to
sustain an appeal.236 Among several other options for satisfying its re-
quirements, § 42.08(b)’s requirements may be met if an owner pays “the
229. Town & Country, 461 S.W.3d 208 at 211.
230. Id. at 214.
231. Id. at 216 (holding, “based on the text of . . . § 42.21(h), other relevant Tax Code
amendments, and the implications of the various asserted interpretations when reading
these provisions as a whole, § 42.21(h) is not limited to cases of misnomer and can be relied
on by property owners in cases of misidentification”).
232. Id. at 217.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 218.
235. EXLP Leasing LLC v. Webb Cty. Appraisal Dist., No. 04-14-00343-CV, 2015 WL
3505107, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, June 3, 2015, pet. denied). At trial, the taxpayer
asserted a similar argument addressed in the “heavy equipment dealer” cases discussed in
this article, specifically that the 2011 amendments to Tax Code § 23.1241(a) allowed them
to pay taxes to the county in which they maintained their business address (here, Victoria
County); as such, the taxpayer here asserted that it owed no taxes on the property at issue
in Webb County and, therefore, the entire amount of the tax assessed by Webb County was
at issue. See supra notes 181–92 (discussing the changes to “heavy equipment dealer
inventory”).
236. EXLP Leasing LLC, 2015 WL 3505107, at *2 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 42.08(b) (West 2015)).
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amount of taxes due on the portion of the taxable value of the property
that is not in dispute.”237 EXLP argued that it was required to pay noth-
ing because it disputed the entire tax assessment; the appraisal district
disagreed and claimed that “courts have repeatedly held that if the prop-
erty owner does not pay any portion of the assessed taxes by the delin-
quency date then the owner has not complied” with the statute.238 The
court of appeals sided with EXLP, relying on the plain language of the
statute.239
B. LEGISLATION
If the franchise tax rate reduction in House Bill 32, discussed supra,
formed one half of this legislative session’s tax relief package, Senate Bill
1 and Senate Joint Resolution 1 comprise the other half. These legislative
enactments increase the mandatory property tax homestead exemption
from $15,000 to $25,000 and require districts to prepare their 2015 tax
rolls and rates by reference to the new, higher exemption amount.240 In-
terestingly, though all sides have long seemed to agree that a real estate
transfer tax is politically unviable in Texas, these enactments also made
official—by constitutional amendment—that the legislature may enact no
law imposing a transfer tax on fee simple transfers of real property.241
Many taxpayers are concerned that another bill, House Bill 2083, fore-
shadows a more vigorous, coming assault on taxpayers’ ability to point to
the constitutional and statutory requirements that property in Texas be
taxed equally and uniformly.242 Case law has confirmed that taxpayers
relying on equal and uniform challenges to property tax values need not
employ experts to select and adjust the values of other properties for pur-
poses of comparing those properties to their own properties.243 House
Bill 2083 requires that the selection and adjustment of comparable
properties must utilize generally accepted appraisal methods and tech-
niques.244 Whether and the extent to which this new provision may be
inconsistent with the legislative history behind the comparable properties
prong of Tax Code § 42.26(a)(3) has been a topic of much debate among
practitioners and taxpayers since its enactment, and may be the focus of
237. Id. at *2 (emphasis in original) (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.08(b)).
238. Id. at *3.
239. Id. at *4–5 (distinguishing the appraisal district’s cases because in all of the cases
there was at least some portion of taxes that was not in dispute). The court of appeals also
dismissed the appraisal district’s argument that EXLP had committed a jurisdictional error
by not filing a statement under Tax Code § 42.08(b-1) stating the amount of undisputed
taxes it would pay. The court of appeals noted that while the case was pending the legisla-
ture amended § 42.08 to expressly provide that the failure to file such a statement is not
jurisdictional. Id. at *5 (citing Act of June 14, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1259, § 29, 2013
Tex. Gen. Laws 3182, 3193 (codified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.08(b-1)).
240. Tex. S.B. 1, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); Tex. S.J.R. 1, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).
241. Tex. S.B. 1, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); Tex. S.J.R. 1, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).
242. See Tex. H.B. 2083, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).
243. See, e.g., Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. United Inv’rs Realty Trust, 47 S.W.3d 648,
653 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
244. Tex. H.B. 2083, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).
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future litigation construing this provision.245
IV. PROCEDURE
A. REPORTED CASES
The Survey period saw significant development in the state’s tax ad-
ministration jurisprudence in the form of several taxpayer-favorable
court decisions addressing multiple procedural issues.
In Hegar v. Ryan, LLC, the Austin Court of Appeals addressed
whether Rule 3.325, pertaining to refund claims, exceeds the comptrol-
ler’s authority by imposing requirements beyond those permitted under
Tax Code § 111.104.246 More specifically, the court of appeals addressed
whether a taxpayer that files a refund claim must provide certain “trans-
actional detail and supporting documentation” with the initial filing of
the claim, or whether it may do so at a later point during the administra-
tive process.247 Key to the comptroller’s publicly-stated justifications for
the stricter requirements appears to be a concern about the administra-
tive burdens of processing voluminous and complex refund claims. Many
taxpayers and practitioners have pointed out the flaws in the comptrol-
ler’s apparent view that making refunds harder to claim is an effective
and permissible way to prevent frivolous claims; still, senior comptroller
personnel have long pointed to the significant cost and time required to
meet their statutory obligations to process these claims. So, while the un-
supported policy shifts in the rule may have been disappointing, they
were largely also unsurprising.
At trial, Ryan, LLC challenged the validity of Rule 3.325(a)(4),
(b)(10), and (e), the effects of compliance with these requirements on the
tolling of the statute of limitations, and the taxpayer’s ability to introduce
evidence at hearing. The trial court ruled in favor of Ryan, LLC and in-
validated all of subsection 3.325(a)(4) of the 2011 rule and subsections
3.325(a)(4), (b)(10), and (e) of the 2013 rule.248
Focusing on the statutory text, the court of appeals noted that “the
parties’ dispute here primarily turns on [the court’s] interpretation of sub-
section 111.104(c)(2) of the Tax Code . . . [which] requires a claim for a
refund to ‘state fully and in detail each reason or ground on which the
claim is founded.’”249 Relying on the plain language of the statute, the
court of appeals held invalid portions of the rule setting forth nine cate-
gories of transactional detail and supporting documentation the comp-
troller required taxpayers to file at the outset of a refund claim pursuant
245. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.26(a)(3) (West 2015).
246. Hegar v. Ryan, LLC, No. 03-13-00400-CV, 2015 WL 3393917, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Austin, May 20, 2015, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
247. Id. at *11.
248. Id. at *3.
249. Id. at *9 (internal citations omitted) (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 111.104(c)(2)).
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to Rule 3.325(a)(4).250 The court of appeals reasoned that these require-
ments exceeded the comptroller’s authority as inconsistent with the pro-
visions of Tax Code § 111.104.251 The court of appeals concluded that the
statute’s plain language allows the taxpayer to prove its entitlement to a
refund “during the administrative or judicial process.”252 The court of ap-
peals upheld the remaining portions of the rules.253
In Sanadco, Inc. v. Office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts of the
State of Texas, the Austin Court of Appeals addressed whether a taxpayer
may challenge an assessment in response to collection actions.254 The
comptroller audited Sanadco’s books, and subsequently filed suit to col-
lect delinquent taxes from Sanadco.255 In response to the comptroller’s
collection suit, Sanadco asserted several counterclaims, relying in part on
the Administrative Procedure Act and the Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ments Act.256 Among its claims, Sanadco argued that AP 92 and AP
122—audit procedure memos issued by the comptroller providing gui-
dance to auditors performing audits of convenience stores—were inval-
idly promulgated administrative rules.257
The court of appeals initially held that the audit procedure memos
were invalidly promulgated rules, but on rehearing, determined that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction over Sanadco’s counterclaims because
Sandadco failed to fulfill the Chapter 112 jurisdictional prerequisites.258
The court of appeals noted that the state’s immunity from suit is limited,
250. Id. at *12. Although generally authorized to promulgate rules to enact Tax Code
legislation, the comptroller may not impose restrictions or qualifications beyond those per-
mitted under the Tax Code. A rule is valid if the legislature unambiguously authorized the
rule or if the rule reasonably resolves a statutory ambiguity. Id. at *7. Here, the statute was
not ambiguous so the court of appeals refused to defer to the comptroller’s interpretation.
Id. at *9.
251. The court of appeals’s decision invalidated the last sentence of subsection (e)(3) of
the 2013 rule requiring the aforementioned documentation to be provided when the refund
is first claimed. Id. at *14; 34 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 3.325(e) (2013).
252. Ryan, LLC, 2015 WL 3393917, at *12; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.105(e)
(allowing at least 180 days for taxpayers claiming a refund under § 111.104 to submit docu-
mentation to enable the comptroller to verify the claim for refund).
253. Ryan, LLC, 2015 WL 3393917, at *8, *14.
254. Sanadco, Inc. v. Office of the Comptroller of Pub. Accounts of the State of Tex.,
No. 03-11-00462-CV, 2015 WL 1478200, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 25, 2015, pet. de-
nied) (mem. op.). Sanadco also filed a separate suit seeking a temporary injunction against
the comptroller and alleging that certain rules “impaired or threatened to impair [its]
rights.” See Sanadco, Inc. v. Hegar, No. 03-14-00771-CV, 2015 WL 4072091, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Austin July 3, 2015, no. pet.) (upholding the trial court’s order denying Sanadco’s
application for a temporary injunction).
255. Sanadco, Inc., 2015 WL 1478200, at *2.
256. Id. at *3–4.
257. Id. at *3. Sanadco also asserted on appeal that the comptroller’s actions were ultra
vires and that the Tax Code provision permitting the use of sampling methods in audits was
unconstitutional. Id. at *4.
258. See Sanadco, Inc. v. Office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of
Texas, No. 03-11-00462-CV, 2013 WL 5477484 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 26, 2013) (mem.
op.), withdrawn and superseded by 2015 WL 1478200 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 25, 2015,
pet. denied) (concluding that AP 92 and AP 122 are rules and were invalidly promulgated);
Sanadco, Inc., 2015 WL 1478200, at *6 (concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
over Sanadco’s counterclaims).
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and even more so in the context of tax assessments.259 While Sanadco had
relied on the Administrative Procedure Act, the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act, and the doctrine of ultra vires, the court of appeals con-
cluded that all of these grounds for relief are “preempted by Chapter 112
of the Tax Code.”260 Therefore, because Sanadco did not file a redetermi-
nation request or follow the procedures for a protest suit or refund claim,
Sanadco was not permitted to challenge the tax assessment against it
upon collection.261 The court of appeals noted, “If Sanadco were able to
pursue its counterclaims free of Chapter 112’s restrictions, the State’s en-
tire tax collection scheme would be disrupted.”262 The court of appeals,
however, qualified its holding by noting that Chapter 112 does not pre-
empt challenges to a rule’s or statute’s constitutionality if such challenges
are brought “prior to the finality of an agency determination.”263
In addition to addressing the constitutionality of the twenty-four-hour
waiting period for certain exports, H.K. Global Trading, Ltd. v. Combs
also addressed the level of specificity required in an administrative pro-
test letter’s citation to a Tax Code subsection in order for a court to have
jurisdiction over the protest.264 The comptroller argued that because H.K.
Global did not cite specifically to subsection 151.307(e), the trial court did
not have jurisdiction to determine that subsection’s constitutionality.265
Section 112.053 provides that the “issues to be determined in the suit are
limited to those arising from the reasons expressed in the written protest
as originally filed.”266 The Austin Court of Appeals noted that although
H.K. Global did not specifically cite subsection 151.307(e), it did cite
other subsections in § 151.307 and more generally to the section as a
whole.267 Furthermore, in its tax protest, H.K. Global was challenging an
assessment against it, which was the result of the operation of subsection
(e).268 The court of appeals therefore concluded that the comptroller was
sufficiently alerted that subsection (e) was at issue, and the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the subsection.269
B. COMPTROLLER RULES
During the Survey period, the comptroller overhauled its rule involving
259. Sanadco, Inc., 2015 WL 1478200, at *4.
260. Id.
261. Id. at *5.
262. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
263. Id. at *6 n.9.
264. H.K. Glob. Trading, Ltd. v. Combs, 429 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet.
denied); see also supra text accompanying notes 43–51 (discussing H.K. Global Trading,
Ltd., 429 S.W. 3d 132).
265. Id. at 135–36.
266. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.053(b) (West 2015).
267. H.K. Glob. Trading, Ltd., 429 S.W.3d at 136.
268. Id.; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.307(e) (“A retailer who makes a refund
before the time prescribed by subsection (d) or makes a refund that is undocumented or
improperly documented is liable for the amount of the tax refunded with interest.”).
269. H.K. Glob. Trading, Ltd., 429 S.W.3d at 136.
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waiver of penalty and interest.270 The rule in many regards effectively
codifies comptroller policy, including long-standing policy that the comp-
troller has discretion to grant penalty and interest waivers.271 Among
other changes, the amendment to the rule clarifies that the comptroller
may grant a partial waiver of interest and that an interest waiver may be
reviewed during an independent audit review.272
Significantly, although the rule still maintains a basic structure of set-
ting out differing standards for waiver requests in audit and non-audit
situations, the standards related to both—particularly as they relate to
waiver of penalty—have been amended to add factors the comptroller
will consider in determining whether to grant a waiver. Regarding penalty
waiver in the audit context, the new rule indicates that the comptroller
may consider errors identified in prior audits.273 The comptroller may
also consider any changes to the law during the audit period, the tax-
payer’s recordkeeping efforts, and the current audit’s error rate.274 In the
non-audit context, the rule indicates that the comptroller may consider
whether waiver was previously granted or denied for any tax type, not
just the tax at issue.275 The comptroller may also consider the taxpayer’s
size and sophistication (a factor that was previously listed only in the fac-
tors for waiver requests in the audit context); whether collection actions
have been taken, and whether the waiver request includes multiple
liabilities.276
Also, relevant for those taxpayers seeking relief from an assessment
based on insolvency under Tax Code § 111.102, the comptroller adopted
new Rule 1.2 during the Survey period.277 The rule sets out procedural
guidelines and deadlines that a taxpayer must meet in order to preserve
its insolvency claim.278 Importantly, the rule states that an insolvency re-
quest and all documentation required by Rule 1.2 should be submitted to
the comptroller after a hearing number has been assigned but before a
notice of hearing is issued.279
V. OTHER SIGNIFICANT APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS
In addition to significant developments with respect to Texas’s big
three taxes—sales, franchise, and property taxes—the Survey period saw
270. See 39 Tex. Reg. 3565 (2014), adopted 39 Tex. Reg. 8406 (2014) (codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.5 (2016) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,
Waiver of Penalty or Interest)).
271. Id.
272. See id. § 3.5(c)(4), (e) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Waiver of Penalty or
Interest).
273. Id. § 3.5(b)(3)(A).
274. Id. § 3.5(b)(3)(D), (I), (L).
275. Id. § 3.5(c)(3)(C), (D).
276. Id. § 3.5(c)(3)(F), (G), (H).
277. 39 Tex. Reg. 5961 (2014) (codified as 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.2 (2016) (Tex.
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Settlement in a Contested Case Based on Insolvency)).
278. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.2.
279. Id. § 1.2(c), (f) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Settlement in a Contested
Case Based on Insolvency).
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significant developments concerning several other areas administered by
the comptroller.
In Highland Homes Ltd. v. State, the Texas Supreme Court addressed
when property is presumed abandoned for unclaimed property pur-
poses.280 Highland Homes, a construction company, would dock its sub-
contractors’ pay if they did not provide proof of general liability
insurance.281 Highland Homes was sued in a class action to recover these
docked amounts and later settled the suit. As part of the settlement,
Highland Homes agreed to refund these amounts to the class. The settle-
ment stipulated that amounts from checks issued to class members that
were not negotiated within ninety days of issuance would be distributed
to The Nature Conservancy as a cy pres award.282 The State intervened,
arguing that the amounts subject to the cy pres award should be held by
Highland Homes for three years and then remitted to the comptroller
pursuant to the Texas Unclaimed Property Act.283
The State argued that Property Code §§ 74.308 and 74.309—which pro-
hibit private escheat agreements and nullify for unclaimed property pur-
poses periods of limitations set by contract, statute, or court—prohibited
the cy pres award.284 The supreme court, however, side-stepped this argu-
ment by concluding that the amounts at issue should not be presumed
abandoned, and therefore the Unclaimed Property Act did not apply to
these amounts.285 The supreme court reasoned that the amounts at issue
were in fact claimed by the class members through their class representa-
tives. The supreme court stated:
Chapter 74 does not apply when a claim to property has been as-
serted or an act of ownership exercised. It is of no consequence that
several owners have not collected their property within the time pe-
riod to which they agreed through class representatives. An owner
need not actually collect his property to rebut the presumption of
abandonment and render the Act inapplicable; he need only claim
it.286
Focusing on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42, which addresses a class
representative’s authority to act on behalf of a class, the supreme court
noted that the State’s argument would succeed only by disregarding the
class representatives’ authority to act on behalf of the class.287
280. Highland Homes Ltd. v. State, 448 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Tex. 2014).
281. Id. at 406.
282. Id. at 406–07.
283. Id. at 408. The State intervened after the parties to the class action suit had sent
notice to the Attorney General of the cy pres award. Id.
284. Id. at 409; see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 74.308–74.309 (West 2015).
285. Highland Homes, 448 S.W.3d 403 at 410.
286. Id. at 411 (emphasis in original).
287. Id. at 412. In response to an additional State argument that cy pres awards can be
the subject of abuse, the supreme court dismissed the argument but cautioned that “trial
courts must be careful in class actions to protect class interests and scrutinize settlement.”
Id.
514 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
In Combs v. Texas Small Tobacco Coalition, the Austin Court of Ap-
peals addressed whether the cigarette tax imposed under the Health and
Safety Code is unconstitutional.288 In 2013, the Texas legislature enacted
a “fee” on cigarettes and tobacco products that applied only to tobacco
companies that did not participate in settlement agreements with the
state relating to claims for antitrust violations and deceptive advertis-
ing.289 Small Tobacco, representing several cigarette manufacturers that
had not participated in the settlement agreements with the state, argued
that the tax is unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal and Uniform
Clause of the Texas constitution and the Equal Protection and Due Pro-
cess clauses of the U.S. Constitution.290
Agreeing with Small Tobacco, the court of appeals concluded that the
tobacco tax violates the Texas constitution.291 Analyzing the reasonable-
ness of the tax’s subject matter classification, the court of appeals stated
that, although the purposes of the tax were laudable, “imposing a tax on
only one class of identical products is not equal and uniform” where the
only justification for the classification was whether a taxpayer entered
into a settlement agreement with the state.292 The court of appeals also
noted that, under the law imposing the tax, Small Tobacco does not re-
ceive a release from claims akin to the release a participating tobacco
company received by entering into a settlement agreement.293 Lastly, the
court of appeals highlighted the differences between Texas’s tax on Small
Tobacco and the majority of states’ solutions for leveling the playing field
between participating and non-participating cigarette manufacturers and
noted that its finding the Texas tax statute unconstitutional was not incon-
sistent with the decisions in other states to uphold escrow statutes as con-
stitutional.294 The Texas Supreme Court granted the comptroller’s
Petition for Review and reversed and remanded the court of appeals’s
decision.295
Another case that made its way to the Texas Supreme Court—and ulti-
mately to the U.S. Supreme Court—involved the sexually oriented busi-
ness (SOB) tax. In Texas Entertainment Association., Inc. v. Combs, after
multiple years of litigation, the validity of the SOB tax—a $5-per-person
288. Combs v. Tex. Small Tobacco Coal., 440 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tex. App.—Austin,
2014), rev’d and remanded, Hegar v. Tex. Small Tobacco Coal., No. 14-0747, 2016 WL
1267843 (Tex. Dec. 8, 2015).
289. Id. at 307–08.
290. Id. at 310–11.
291. Id. at 313.
292. Id. at 310–11.
293. Id. at 312.
294. Id. at 312–13. Other states established escrow statutes in which non-settling manu-
facturers are required to make deposits into escrow accounts for the purpose of securing
damage awards for successful cigarette-related claims, along with a promise to return any
escrow funds remaining in the accounts after 25 years; distinguishing these escrow ac-
counts, the court of appeals noted that the Texas cigarette fee is a tax, from which proceeds
are deposited in the state’s general fund with no chance of an eventual return. Id.
295. Hegar v. Tex. Small Tobacco Coal., No. 14-0747, 2016 WL 1267843, at *1 (Tex.
Dec. 8, 2015).
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entry fee imposed on businesses that both sell alcoholic beverages and
offer live nude entertainment—was upheld.296 On November 21, 2014,
the Texas Supreme Court denied Texas Entertainment’s petition for re-
view,297 and on March 23, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Texas
Entertainment’s petition, preserving the Austin Court of Appeals deci-
sion that upheld the validity of the SOB fee.298
Texas Entertainment argued that the SOB tax was an invalid occupa-
tion tax because it did not allocate “25% of its revenue to public schools”
as required by the Texas constitution, and alternatively, that the tax was
not “equal and uniform because it applie[d] only to businesses that pro-
vide live nude entertainment to audiences of two or more.”299 The court
of appeals concluded that the tax was not an invalid occupation tax and
did not violate the Equal and Uniform Clause of the Texas
constitution.300
Relying on the Texas Supreme Court’s definition of an occupation tax
as “a form of excise tax imposed upon a person for the privilege of carry-
ing on a business, trade or occupation,” the court of appeals explained
that taxes imposed “for the privilege of doing business in Texas” must
contain classifications that relate to the “differences that affect the value
of doing business.”301 The court of appeals looked at the substance of the
classification, the primary purpose of the law, and the plain language of
the statute to determine that the SOB tax was not a tax on “the privilege
of providing nude entertainment in the presence of alcohol consumption”
in part because a business could continue operations and avoid the tax by
choosing not to serve alcohol in connection with nude entertainment.302
The court of appeals was not persuaded by Texas Entertainment’s as-
sertion that limiting the SOB tax’s applicability to businesses that provide
nude entertainment to audiences of two or more but excluding businesses
that provide nude entertainment to audiences of one violates the Equal
and Uniform Clause of the Texas constitution.303 The court of appeals
also was not persuaded by Texas Entertainment’s argument that the clas-
sification at issue had no rational basis and overcame the strong presump-
296. Tex. Entm’t Ass’n., Inc. v. Combs, 431 S.W.3d 790, 793 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014,
pet. denied), cert. denied, Tex. Entm’t Ass’n, Inc. v. Hegar, 135 S. Ct. 1568 (2015).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 795; see also TEX. CONST. art. VII § 3(a). Texas Entertainment also asserted
that the SOB tax was an unconstitutional restraint on free speech. Tex. Entm’t Ass’n, 431
S.W.3d at 795. Texas Entertainment, however, offered no explanation as to why the Texas
constitution offers greater protection than the U.S. Constitution with respect to free speech
associated with nude entertainment; as such, the court of appeals overruled Texas En-
tertainment’s third issue claiming the SOB fee violated the Free Speech Clause of the
Texas constitution. Id. at 800; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8.
300. Texas Entm’t Ass’n, 431 S.W.3d 790 at 800.
301. Id. at 797. (citing Conlen Grain & Mercantile, Inc. v. Tex. Grain Sorghum Produc-
ers Bd. 519 S.W.2d 620, 624 (Tex. 1975); In re Nestle USA, Inc. 387 S.W.3d 610, 622 (Tex.
2012)).
302. Id. at 798–99.
303. Id. at 799–800; see also TEX. CONST. art. VIII § 1(a).
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tion of constitutional validity.304 Rather, the court of appeals concluded
that the SOB tax’s classification is not unreasonable and explained that
“limiting the [SOB] tax’s applicability to businesses with audiences of two
or more reasonably relates” to the goal of alleviating adverse effects of
nude entertainment combined with alcohol consumption.305 According to
the court of appeals, the legislature could have reasonably believed that
such adverse effects did not exist at businesses offering nude entertain-
ment to an audience of one to the extent that such effects may exist at
businesses offering such entertainment to larger audiences.306
VI. CONCLUSION
This Survey period saw many novel legal arguments come out of Texas
state and local tax litigation and likewise saw the comptroller propose a
number of significant revisions to the state’s regulatory regime. Already,
the comptroller’s office is working on making further changes to existing
rules and on promulgating new rules around issues that taxpayers and
agency personnel could benefit from more, or clearer, guidance. Though
the 84th Texas legislature was relatively quiet from a tax perspective, key
reforms are on the horizon. The Texas state tax community talks on a
biennial basis about repealing and replacing the franchise tax, of course,
and that topic promises to come up again over the course of the next
year. There has also been much discussion—and, already, some action—
relating to a potential overhaul of the state’s system of property tax ad-
ministration. While Texas has long been, and in many ways remains, the
superlative business-friendly state, it will be interesting to see how much
effort legislators, the governor, and the comptroller devote in the coming
months and in the 2017 session to reviewing and enhancing the state’s tax
incentive programs. The months preceding a legislative session in Texas
are always full of unexpected twists and turns. If the 84th Texas legislative
session was the calm before a gathering storm in the state tax world, the
run-up to the 85th Texas legislative session promises to bring even more
intrigue than usual.
304. Id. at 799–800.
305. Id. at 800.
306. Id.
